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Abstract 
 
Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate 
philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their 
valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act 
are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that 
corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO 
shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity 
donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO 
compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that 
corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources 
that reduce firm value. (JEL G30, G34, J33, N3) 
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This study investigates corporate charitable contributions as an important form of discretionary 
corporate expenditures. Although corporate charitable contributions are frequent and often substantial,1 
there is no clear evidence in the literature on whether these expenditures have positive effects on firm 
revenues or performance or on shareholder wealth. Proponents assert that corporate giving is consistent 
with shareholder value maximization because it offers a channel for firms to promote their image to 
customers and to enhance their standing with regulatory agencies and legislators (Navarro 1988; Brown, 
Helland, and Smith 2006). The counterargument is that corporate giving can often reflect conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers, where managers support their own charity preferences with 
corporate funds and enhance their personal reputations and social networks.2 Because it is difficult to 
measure the benefits that accrue to a corporation from charitable contributions, it is easier for CEOs to 
promote their personal preferences, allowing these decisions to substantially depart from firm value and 
shareholder wealth maximization. The ambiguity surrounding the benefits of corporate giving has 
attracted the attention of the popular media (see Monk and Minow 2004) and prompted legislators and 
government agencies to call for greater disclosure of contributions in which a connection to company 
executives or directors exists (see Appendix A; Securities and Exchange Commission 1992). 
Although several studies evaluate these competing hypotheses by focusing on the associations 
between corporate charitable contributions and other explanatory variables, no existing study has 
measured the relation between these contributions and the private preferences of CEOs, assessed the 
impact of corporate giving on company valuation or performance, or analyzed the channels through 
which corporate giving affects firm value. By addressing these issues, this study helps identify the relative 
importance of these two alternative hypotheses in explaining corporate giving decisions. 
                                                            
1Total U.S. corporate giving in 2010 is $15.29 billion (Giving USA 2011 report). 
2A classic example of private benefits of corporate giving is Occidental Petroleum’s decision to fund the building of a museum 
named in honor of its CEO and founder, Armand Hammer. Because of a shareholder suit, Occidental agreed to limit its 
construction spending to $60 million plus $35 million for an annuity to be paid over thirty years. See Monk and Minow (2004) 
for more details. 
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Our investigation begins with an analysis of the profit maximization and agency theory motives 
for corporate giving. Our findings offer weak support for the conventional idea that corporate giving is 
profit enhancing. Specifically, when we model the likelihood of corporate philanthropy as a function of a 
firm’s profit motive, CEO attributes, and corporate governance variables, we find insignificant relations 
with profit motive variables. However, modeling the determinants of the charitable giving level, we do 
find several significant associations with profit maximizing incentives, specifically firm intellectual 
property investment, visibility, and membership in a highly regulated industry. Although existing 
theoretical and empirical studies, for example, Navarro (1988), view advertising to be a major motivation 
for corporate giving, our results fail to find a significant relation between corporate giving and advertising 
intensity. In contrast, we uncover substantial evidence supporting agency motives. More specifically, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that CEO consumption of private benefits is negatively related to her 
shareholding level and positively related to her specific charity preferences. Consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), we find that CEO charity connections—an observable measure of charity preferences—
raise both the likelihood and amount of corporate giving by 21.5% and 1.5%, respectively, whereas a 10% 
rise in CEO ownership reduces the likelihood and amount of corporate giving by 40% and 3%, 
respectively. 
To provide an exogenous source of variation about key CEO attributes, we use the 2003 dividend 
tax cut as a natural experiment. This tax reform reduced the personal dividend tax rate from a maximum 
rate of 35% to 15% (Chetty and Saez 2005) and thus increased the cost of CEOs pursuing their private 
preferences toward charitable giving to the extent that these contributions reduce a firm’s profitability and 
share value. This is especially true when CEO ownership levels are high because it directly reduces CEO 
wealth. Consistent with the implication of this Tax Reform Act for CEO incentives, we find that corporate 
giving significantly declines after 2003, and this effect becomes stronger as CEO ownership increases. 
In further analysis, we test whether corporate giving is incrementally beneficial for a sample of 
firms with relatively large expenditures on advertising and R&D, as these firms are often assumed to 
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benefit most from charitable contributions (Navarro 1988; Brown, Helland, and Smith 2006). We find no 
evidence to support this corporate giving incentive: in fact, we find that the relationships with advertising 
and R&D expenditures are statistically insignificant, whereas CEO ownership and personal charity 
connections remain significant in explaining a firm’s level of corporate giving. On the other hand, we 
identify a more muted effect of CEO ownership and a more pronounced effect of CEO charity 
connections in subsamples of firms in which managers are entrenched or weakly monitored by the board. 
These findings indicate that although agency problems associated with corporate giving appear to be 
widespread, they are more severe in firms exhibiting weaker corporate governance. 
To further assess the explanatory power of the two competing hypotheses, we examine how 
corporate giving affects firm value through its impact on the market valuation of firm cash holdings. Cash 
generally represents an important proportion of a firm’s total asset, enabling firms to make investments 
rapidly without having to access external capital markets. Thus, cash holding helps to avoid transaction 
costs and asymmetric information costs associated with external financing. However, corporate liquidity 
comes at a price. Cash reserves provide managers with a ready source of funds for expenditures in 
projects that give them private benefits at the expense of shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
As a result, investors have reasons to substantially discount the value of retained cash, especially in firms 
with weak board oversight that make large charitable contributions, because they indicate greater agency 
problems. Using a methodology developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006), we find that corporate giving 
has a substantial impact on firm value through its impact on cash: the estimated marginal value of cash is 
8.1 cents lower if a firm raises corporate giving from the 50th to the 75th percentile level. For firms with 
nonindependent boards having weaker board oversight, the negative impact of corporate giving on firm 
value more than doubles. These findings are consistent with the view that shareholders anticipate a greater 
misuse of cash reserves as charitable giving rises and therefore place a lower value on cash. 
To provide a more direct causal link between corporate giving and shareholder wealth, we (again) 
use the 2003 Tax Reform Act as a natural experiment. Earlier, we found that corporate giving declines 
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after the tax cut. Now, we examine whether subsequent reductions in corporate giving lead to dividend 
increases. Specifically, we focus on firms that make charitable contributions in 2002 and investigate if 
changes in charitable contributions are related to dollar dividend changes in 2004. We find that for a $1 
million reduction in corporate giving after the tax-cut year, these firms on average raise dividends by at 
least $6.4 million. Thus, our experiment shows that firms reducing charitable giving immediately after the 
Tax Reform Act of 2003 are not reacting to weak earnings because they also raise dividends, but it is 
consistent with managers reducing their consumption of private benefits as the after-tax cost increases. 
Having uncovered a body of evidence that corporate giving represents an agency problem, we 
conduct a series of tests to address how and why corporate giving destroys firm value. First, we examine 
whether corporate giving offers attractive avenues for managerial rent extraction by investigating the 
frequency and level of corporate contributions to charities with CEOs ties, defined as CEOs holding 
positions as trustees, directors, or advisors (henceforth, CEO-affiliated charities). We find that about two 
out of three firms that make charity contributions include major donations to CEO-affiliated charities. The 
average cost to a firm from such contributions is larger than the combined costs of CEO corporate jet use 
and other perks (Yermack 2006) and is comparable to a CEO’s promised cash severance payments 
(Rusticus 2006). Furthermore, CEO-affiliated charity contributions decline if CEO financial interests are 
more aligned with shareholder interests. These findings suggest that corporate giving is not solely 
determined by firm value maximization but instead is a channel that serves managerial private interests.  
Second, we conduct an event study of corporate disclosures of “charity awards.” This allows us to 
gauge how investors perceive charitable contributions in which company executives and directors have 
charitable ties, providing empirical evidence that is much less subject to endogeneity concerns. In revising 
disclosure rules on compensation in 1992, the SEC recognized such awards as a form of compensation 
and required firms to report them in proxy statements. We document a three-day cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of -0.87% (p-value = 0.014) for firms that report first-time charity awards from 1993–2010. 
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This wealth loss substantially exceeds the nominal value of the announced charitable award programs, 
suggesting the market capitalizes the costs of expected future contributions to these charities.  
Third, we separately analyze the determinants of annual corporate giving to charities and 
contributions to charitable corporate foundations to evaluate the seriousness of an agency problem 
associated with these two channels of corporate giving. Foundations are tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations that receive irreversible donations of typically large size from sponsoring companies. Also, 
foundations typically make contributions at unknown future dates to charities only identified later. The 
critical factor for these foundations is the separation between the economic affairs of shareholders and 
those of foundations.3 This separation negates any shareholder claim on any donations transferred to the 
foundations and therefore poses a classic agency problem for firms that make charitable contributions 
through foundations. In further empirical analysis, we find that giving to foundations increases with both 
a CEO’s charity connections and weaker corporate governance, while annual direct giving to charities 
increases with stronger corporate governance and is not related to a CEO’s charitable affiliations. These 
results suggest that the adverse impact of corporate giving on firm value is largely due to the sizable 
donations to corporate charitable foundations that yield no clear benefit to the corporation itself. 
Thus far, our results indicate that CEOs realize personal benefits from corporate giving. However, 
these benefits still could be part of an optimal compensation contract. Specifically, if boards reduce CEO 
compensation for the portion of corporate contributions that benefit them, then a CEO’s private benefits 
would be lessened.4 So in our fourth line of analysis, we study the relation between CEO compensation 
and corporate giving. In the empirical analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, we find 
that CEO compensation is not reduced by the private benefits of corporate giving, contradicting the 
prediction of the optimal contracting hypothesis. As a robustness test, we also estimate an instrumental 
variables model and find a statistically significant positive relation between CEO compensation and 
                                                            
3Consider the case of Lehman Brothers Foundation, for example. Although its sponsoring company was liquidated in 2008, the 
foundation still exists under the name of The Neuberger Berman Foundation. In the year of liquidation, the foundation had a 
market value of assets of $23.4 million, which was not distributed to company shareholders. As of November 2012, the 
foundation still uses that asset for philanthropic reasons. 
4Fama’s (1980) ex post settling up argument suggests boards reduce compensation for firm contributions that benefit managers. 
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corporate giving, suggesting that the probability of a company paying excess CEO compensation is 
significantly higher when these companies make larger charitable contributions. This is especially true for 
corporate foundation giving. 
The last round of analysis studies a specific channel of entrenchment that aims to test whether 
CEOs use corporate giving to support the charitable interests of independent directors. Cespa and Cestone 
(2007) argue that CEOs use corporate resources strategically to build ties with stakeholders to receive 
favorable treatment during future contract renewal or turnover decisions. We propose a more direct form 
of entrenchment that can occur if CEOs can direct firm donations to accommodate independent director 
charitable interests.5 Specifically, we examine whether corporate supported charitable causes overlap with 
independent director charitable interests measured by their charitable affiliations and then evaluate the 
effect of this alignment on CEO compensation. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, we find a 69% 
overlap with the interests of independent directors, indicating that corporate giving serves independent 
director charity interests, which can also strengthen their ties to a CEO. In further analysis, we find that 
this particular alignment of charitable interests is positively associated with excess CEO compensation. 
These results suggest that CEOs also allocate corporate charitable contributions to advance their own 
financial interests through the potential co-option of independent directors. 
While our evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory, it is likely that in many 
specific instances corporate giving at least partially benefits shareholders. However, such cases appear to 
be less frequent and the benefits are more indirect and difficult to measure, while these charitable 
contributions definitely represent a direct cost to shareholders. Taken together, the results of this study 
document another important mechanism for managerial rent extraction and entrenchment. 
1. Theories and Hypotheses 
                                                            
5This analysis is motivated by the giving practices at Enron. Lay’s foundation (named after CEO Kenneth Lay) and the Enron 
corporate foundation jointly donated money to research centers that employed two Enron board members. 
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We consider two primary theories of corporate charitable contributions. The first theory posits 
that corporate giving is motivated by shareholder wealth maximization, whereas the second theory views 
corporate giving as a manifestation of private benefits of control. The following subsections discuss these 
theories and predictions and describe the variables used to test these predictions. 
1.1 Shareholder wealth maximization theory 
Under shareholder wealth maximization theory, corporate giving is undertaken to improve a 
company’s financial performance, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H1 (a): Corporate giving positively affects a firm’s financial performance. 
Two common approaches to assessing firm financial performance are operating performance and 
stock price performance. To test the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis, we primarily focus on 
stock returns because operating performance is generally considered a major determinant of corporate 
giving (see Petrovits 2006; Galaskiewicz 1997). One advantage to focusing on stock returns is that the 
endogeneity concerns around corporate giving are less problematic when the dependent variable of 
interest is a market-based measure. Short-term stock returns reflect investor reactions to corporate giving 
announcements and are forward looking. In addition, we use dividend changes around a major reduction 
in personal taxes to gauge the impact of a rise in after-tax cost of corporate giving. 
In one model consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, Navarro (1988) specifies three 
dimensions of corporate giving, namely, revenue enhancement, cost reduction, and tax minimization. 
Revenue enhancem nt represents corporate philanthropy that is part of an overall advertising strategy 
designed to promote a firm’s image to raise demand for a firm’s product. This perspective predicts a 
positive relation between a firm’s giving-to-sales ratio and its propensity to advertise. Firms with large 
intellectual property investment or R&D expenditures can also find that corporate giving enhances 
expected revenue. For example, an R&D-intensive company can make targeted charitable contributions to 
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nonprofit research institutions, such as universities that carry out studies in collaboration with the 
company.  
Under a cost reduction scenario, firms can use charitable contributions to reduce the expected 
costs of government regulatory and enforcement actions. Because firms in highly regulated and out-of-
favor industries are more vulnerable to regulatory actions and litigation costs, they have greater incentives 
to maintain a good public image and thus make larger charitable contributions. Lastly, Navarro (1988) 
argues that corporate taxes do not affect the level of corporate giving because the corporate income tax 
proportionally reduces a firm’s expected revenue and expected costs of corporate giving, leaving 
corporate profits unaffected by a change in the corporate tax rate.6 Likewise, the personal tax rate has no 
effect on corporate giving incentives because it proportionally reduces after-personal tax cash flows of 
corporate giving, implying that both a firm’s expected revenue and cost (corporate tax deductions) of 
corporate giving are proportionally reduced. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2 (a): Corporate giving is positively related to a firm’s advertising level, intellectual property 
investment, general visibility, and sales in out-of-favor industries, while it is insensitive to the 
corporate tax rate and the personal tax rate. 
To test this hypothesis empirically, we construct several variables to capture a firm’s profit 
motive. Following Navarro (1988) and Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006), we formulate ad-to-sales and 
R&D-to-sales ratios to measure a firm’s propensity to advertise and its intellectual property investment 
intensity, respectively. We define assets (log), number of employees (log), and number of shareholders 
(log) to measure a firm’s overall visibility and indicator variables for sin and nonenvironmentally friendly 
industries to identify sales in out-of-favor industries, such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, coal, and 
others listed in Appendix C.  
We also include indicator variables for industries that have particularly strong reasons to make 
larger charitable contributions for several reasons. Financial, utilities, and pharmaceutical industries face 
                                                            
6Company-sponsored foundations can help firms optimally time tax deductions for charitable contributions by recording larger 
deductions if contributions are made when their marginal tax rate is high. The empirical literature (see Table 3 in Petrovits 2006) 
finds a weak positive relation between foundation giving and corporate tax rates, suggesting that costs overweigh benefits. 
 at Queensland University of Technology on November 25, 2014
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
11 
 
strong regulatory oversight, so corporate giving by firms in these industries has a larger cost reduction 
motive because it can yield more favorable regulatory treatment. On the other hand, image is an important 
asset for retail industries, so firms in these industries are likely to contribute more to charities out of a 
revenue enhancement motive. To measure the corporate tax rate, we define the marginal tax rate 
following Graham and Mills (2008).7 Also, because there is no cross-sectional variation in CEO personal 
taxes, we must rely on time-series variation in major regulations to evaluate the impact of personal tax on 
corporate giving. Appendix C reports the definitions of these variables. 
1.2 Agency theory 
Looking at corporate giving as an agency problem assumes that such giving does not yield greater 
expected revenue or lower costs than the dollar cost of this giving but instead represents a diversion of 
corporate resources, which reduces firm value on a dollar for dollar basis with the size of the charitable 
contribution. Such corporate giving also can be symptomatic of governance problems at a firm. These 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1 (b): Corporate giving negatively affects financial performance. 
In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider conflicts of interest and agency costs 
as inherent elements in any principal-agent relation. They observe that when owner-managers reduce their 
firm ownership level below 100%, incentives increase for utility-maximizing managers to consume more 
corporate resources. Thus, a clear prediction of their model is that the private benefits of corporate giving 
will vary inversely with CEO percentage ownership. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also note that “agency 
costs . . . will depend on the tastes of managers, [and] the ease with which they can exercise their own 
preferences” (328). So private benefits of corporate giving should be positively related to a CEO’s 
personal preference for charity and negatively related to the strength of a firm’s corporate governance, a 
scenario that places constraints on a CEO pursuing private benefits of control. The agency theory view 
also predicts a positive relation between corporate giving and the corporate and personal tax rates, 
                                                            
7We thank Professor John R. Graham for generously providing data on marginal tax rates. 
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because the personal cost to managers of corporate giving declines linearly with the corporate and 
personal tax rates. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2 (b): Corporate giving is positively related to a CEO’s personal preference for charity and the 
corporate and personal tax rates, but is negatively related to a CEO’s fractional ownership of the 
firm and the strength of its corporate governance. 
To measure a CEO’s personal preference for charity, we define a variable called CEO charity 
connection that takes the value of one if the CEO is personally affiliated with nonprofit organizations as 
an officer, director or advisor, and zero otherwise.8 To measure a manager’s fractional ownership, we 
define CEO ownership as the sum of a CEO’s current share ownership percentage and the share 
percentage from exercising the CEO stock option holdings scaled by the option’s delta, defined as the 
first derivative of the Black-Scholes call option value with respect to stock price. 
Following Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), and Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2009), we consider board size, fraction of independent directors, CEO-chairman duality, the 
E-index, and non-CEO director share ownership as factors that affect a firm’s governance structure.9 
Board size is the logarithm of number of directors, whereas fraction of independent directors refers to the 
number of independent directors divided by board size. The E-index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) is defined as the sum of six antitakeover defense indicators that take a value of one for each 
defense the firm employs from the following list: staggered boards, limits on shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments. Lastly, director ownership is the sum of all non-CEO director 
percentage shareholdings in the company. Appendix C presents the definitions of the variables. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that while legal professionals tend to differentiate corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) from corporate giving (e.g., Altschuller 2010), many companies reporting on 
their CSR activity point to their corporate giving as a prime example, highlighting the fact that corporate 
                                                            
8A separate literature on individual charitable contributions finds social connections play an important role (List and Price 2010).  
9In robustness, we include indicators for a fully independent nominating committee, an outside blockholder-director, dual class 
shares, a CEO-founder or founding family member, and a classified board or the G-index (as a substitute for the E-index). 
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giving is one major form of CSR. It follows that some corporate social responsibility actions have 
incentives similar to those of corporate charitable giving.10 Thus, it is not surprising that the CSR and 
corporate giving literatures make several similar predictions, all of which are rooted in firm profit 
enhancement or shareholder wealth maximization objectives. For example, Bernea, Heinkel, and Kraus 
(2008) argue that the marginal impact of CSR expenditures is greater for firms in out-of-favor industries, 
suggesting larger social expenditures are optimal for firms in these industries. Similarly, Benabou and 
Tirole (2010) propose a greater prevalence of investor-demanded CSR actions among more visible firms.  
Nonetheless, distinct differences exist between CSR activities and corporate charitable donations. 
For example, CSR expenditures can include activities that lower the risk of environment disasters and 
other adverse environmental effects that represent large contingent liabilities. Thus, strategic motives can 
play a larger role in CSR decisions. Despite such strategic motives, empirical studies that examine stock 
market reactions to CSR announcements (Krüger forthcoming) or quasinatural experiments, in which the 
cost of CSR exogenously changes (e.g., Cheng, Hong, and Shue 2013), find that these activities reduce 
shareholder wealth, an outcome attributed to overinvestment in CSR activities. In contrast, corporate 
giving offers CEOs ample opportunities to consume excess perquisites and can result in co-opted boards. 
2. Sample 
2.1 Data 
We focus on the Fortune 500 companies as of April 17, 2006, and hand-collect corporate giving 
data from the National Directory of Corporate Giving (NDCG). To ensure accuracy, the NDCG only 
includes corporate giving that is verified by companies themselves or compiled from reliable public 
records based on foundation 990-PF filings with the IRS for foundation giving.11 In contrast, direct annual 
giving is voluntarily disclosed publicly by a corporation or to the NDCG upon its request. Using all 
                                                            
10Examples of the links between corporate giving and CSR activities found in the literature include Benabou and Tirole (2010), 
who consider corporate philanthropy as a part CSR and Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006), who specifically write that “the 
[corporate philanthropy] literature is intertwined with the “social responsibility of business” debate.” 
11Corporate giving data from NDCG includes grants to individuals, employee matching gifts, and in-kind gifts. The individual 
items are often not separately available. 
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directories between 1997 and 2007 to construct a database that spans the 1996–2006 period, we collect 
data on corporate contributions to charities and foundations.12 We then add these amounts to obtain total 
firm contributions (see Appendix B for details). Figure 1 shows that Fortune 500 firms represent a 
substantial percentage of aggregate corporate charitable contributions in the United States. 13  This 
percentage ranges from 16% in 2000 to 32.2% in 2003. We hand-match firm-level contributions data with 
PERMNOs and GVKEYs (company identification numbers in CRSP and Compustat, respectively) for 
our sample firms. 
We next require that all necessary data be available in CRSP, Compustat, Execucomp, and 
RiskMetrics. In particular, firm assets, sales, leverage, number of employees and shareholders, advertising 
and R&D expenses, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s q, free cash flow, and SIC industry classifications 
are taken from Compustat. One-year cumulative stock returns and volatility are based on data taken from 
CRSP. Information on CEO shareholdings, exercisable options, unexercisable options, and total 
compensation comes from Execucomp, whereas information on board size, independent director 
percentage, total director share ownership, CEO-chairman duality, and the E-index is taken from 
RiskMetrics. 
Of the companies in the Fortune 500 universe, we identify thirty-two private firms without the 
necessary data. After removing these companies and merging all the databases with hand-collected 
contributions data, the final sample has 2,421 firm-year observations from 406 firms in the 1996–2006 
sample period. 
2.2  Descriptive statistics 
Panels A and B of Table 1 present the distribution of giving and its determinants, most of which 
are discussed in Section 1. We consider two additional CEO attributes and several other firm 
                                                            
12Ending our sample period in 2006, because of the availability of National Directory of Corporate Giving data at the time of our 
data collection, works to our advantage, as the global financial crisis begins in 2007. Note that it is beyond the scope of our study 
to evaluate the effect of this financial crisis on corporate giving, not to mention that very little postcrisis data are available.  
13In Figure 1, we exclude the first four years of our sample because of data availability. Total corporate contributions data are not 
available before 1997, whereas NDCG directories were not issued in 1998 or in 2000. 
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characteristics. We include CEO reputation because reputational damage from the media identifying a 
CEO as pursuing self-serving activities may exceed any gain that a highly reputable CEO can accrue from 
corporate giving.14 Using the CEO reputation variables in Milbourn (2003), we define tenure and outside 
appointment to measure a CEO’s tenure with the company and outside recruitment status, respectively. 
Motivated by existing studies, firm-level control variables include asset/employee, leverage, ROA, 
Tobin’s q, and a free cash flow indicator (Yermack 2006; Petrovits 2006; Galaskiewicz 1997). The free 
cash flow indicator captures CEO empire building incentives (Jensen 1986). Leverage can be thought of 
as a governance variable that measures creditor incentives to monitor the firm and thereby mitigate the 
problems associated with free cash flows and the consumption of private benefits. Detailed definitions of 
these variables are provided in Appendix C.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports that the average amount of annual direct corporate giving to charities 
for our sample firms, including firms making no contributions, is $2.5 million per year, whereas the 
average amount of corporate donations transferred to foundations is $6.5 million per year. Adding these 
two sources, the average total amount of corporate giving is $9 million per year, slightly less than the 
amount documented by Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006).15 
For CEO attributes, we find that 71% of the Fortune 500 CEOs are connected with nonprofits or 
charitable organizations. This suggests that most CEOs have active charitable interests. The sum of a 
typical CEO’s stock and option ownership is 1.8%, which is slightly higher than that reported by 
Yermack (2006), who only considers stock ownership. In addition, the typical CEO on average works for 
the firm for seventeen years, holds the CEO position for four years, and is more likely to be an internal 
appointment. We find only 21.5% of CEOs are external appointments, similar to Milbourn’s (2003) 
findings. 
                                                            
14For example, when a prolife activist group boycotted Berkshire Hathaway, its CEO Warren E. Buffett cancelled its corporate 
giving program, which through its funding to the Buffett Foundation frequently supported organizations that promoted population 
control. Source: The Chronicle of Philanthropy (July 24, 2003). 
15The difference could be due to stricter data collection procedure of this study (see Appendix B). Excluding firms making no 
charitable contributions, the average annual corporate giving amounts to charities and to a firm’s sponsored foundation are $22.8 
million and $12.3 million, respectively. 
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Turning to the firm’s corporate governance, the median sample firm has an eleven-member 
board, a majority of whom are independent, and a CEO who chairs the board. On average, the sample 
firms have two of the six major antitakeover provisions included in the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009) E-index. In addition, directors as a whole (excluding the CEO) own 0.78% of the outstanding 
shares in a typical firm. 
Turning to firm attributes reported in Table 1, panel A, we find that on average a sample 
company has approximately 29,500 employees, 24,000 shareholders, $13.11 billion of assets, and an 
average marginal tax rate of 33%. Moreover, it annually spends 1.2% and 2.0% of sales on advertising 
and R&D expenses, respectively. These statistics are similar to those documented by Brown, Helland, and 
Smith (2006). Moreover, the average company has a leverage ratio of 18.2%, an ROA of 13.5% and a 
Tobin’s q of 1.9, while approximately 14% of the free cash flow observations are negative. Panel B of 
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms across the Fama-French 48 industries. We find that Fortune 500 
firms are clustered in retail (10.7%), utilities (9.3%), banking (6.3%), insurance (5.9%), oil (4.3%), 
business services (4.2%), and wholesale industries (4.1%). 
Panel C of Table 1 presents univariate comparisons between giving and nongiving firms. Giving 
firms, which represent 59.2% of the sample, have greater visibility when measured by asset size and 
number of employees or shareholders. In addition, these firms spend a greater fraction of their sales on 
advertising and R&D expenses. These findings are consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization 
theory. On the other hand, a significantly greater percentage of CEOs in giving firms have charitable 
connections. These giving firm CEOs have lower (stock and option) ownership, which may reflect giving 
firms’ typically larger size, a lower likelihood of being outside appointment, and a greater likelihood of 
being a board chairman. These firms are also characterized by larger boards (although slightly more 
independent), lower non-CEO director share ownership, and a higher Graham and Mills (2008) marginal 
corporate tax rate measure. Consistent with our findings on non-CEO director ownership, we find in 
untabulated analysis that director-blockholders are significantly less prevalent in giving firms (1.32% 
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versus 3.24%).16 Moreover, a larger fraction of giving firms has positive free cash flows. These facts are 
consistent with agency theory and suggest potential governance or agency conflicts in giving firms. 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Determinants of corporate giving 
We evaluate the predictions of profit maximization and agency cost theories of corporate giving 
using firm-level panel data. We estimate the following regression equation: 
Corp givingi,t+1 = α + β.(profit motivesi,t) + γ.(CEO attributesi,t) + δ.(governancei,t) + ζ.Xi,t + yt + εi,t,  (1) 
where profit motives, CEO attributes, and governance are vectors of characteristics described in the 
previous section. The subscripts i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. The vector X includes other 
firm level characteristics, whereas yt denotes year fixed effects. All the explanatory variables are taken 
from the year prior to the corporate giving year. In robustness analysis, we find that contemporaneous 
explanatory variables yield similar results.17 
We report logit and tobit estimates to assess the likelihood and expected amount of corporate 
giving, respectively. To standardize giving data across firms, we follow Navarro (1988) and divide 
corporate giving by company sales, although our results do not change if we scale corporate giving by 
company assets. We then take the natural logarithm of one plus scaled corporate giving to address the 
right skewness of giving data. Because giving is a small fraction of sales, we also multiply the logarithmic 
function by 103. Therefore, the dependent variable in the tobit specification is log(1 + corporate giving / 
sales) x 103, which we designate as the giving ratio. A tobit model is used because the corporate giving 
ratio is (left) censored at zero. 
Panels A and B of Table 2 present logit and tobit regression estimates, respectively. The first two 
models of each panel separately test the predictions of shareholder wealth maximization and agency 
                                                            
16A director-blockholder is defined as an outside director with at least 5% stock ownership of the firm. 
17For profit motives, we also consider two additional variables. Because Compustat has missing data for advertising and R&D 
expenses, we define two indicator variables, that is, ad indicator and R&D indicator, that take the value of zero if the data is 
missing and one otherwise (Flannery and Rangan 2006). 
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theories, whereas the third model jointly investigates the explanatory power of the two theories. In the last 
column of both panels, the marginal effects of the logit and tobit regressions are presented based on 
model 3. We find that both the likelihood and amount of corporate giving decline as a CEO becomes 
more aligned with shareholder interests, whereas they rise when a CEO has a personal affiliation with 
specific charities. Specifically, a 10% increase in CEO ownership above the sample average reduces the 
likelihood of corporate giving by 40% and the giving ratio (conditional on it being positive) by 3%, 
whereas a CEO charity connection increases them by 21.5% and 1.5%, respectively. 18  Other CEO 
attributes, that is, tenure and outside appointment, have weak power to explain the likelihood or the 
amount of corporate giving and lack statistical significance. 
In contrast to previous studies (Navarro 1988; Brown, Helland, and Smith 2006), we find that the 
ad-to-sales ratio, one of the main variables associated with the shareholder wealth maximization 
hypothesis, is insignificant. This variable is only significant in models in which robust standard errors are 
not clustered at the firm level.19 We also find that firms in sin and nonenvironmentally friendly industries 
do not contribute more to charities, an outcome that fails to support the prediction that firms in out-of-
favor industries contribute more to charities (Bernea, Heinkel, and Kraus 2008). However, there is some 
evidence consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis. Firms that are more visible 
(Benabou and Tirole 2010), invest more in R&D (Brown, Helland, and Smith 2006), and firms in 
financial and pharmaceutical industries are associated with more giving. However, these results are not 
robust as their statistical significance is unstable across alternative regression specifications in panels A 
and B of Table 2. Lastly, consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization theory, we find that the 
marginal tax rate estimate is insignificant. 
Governance variables have little success in explaining the likelihood or the amount of corporate 
giving. Only the E-index is found to increase the giving ratio significantly. However, its economic effect 
                                                            
18The coefficient estimates of CEO ownership and CEO ownership2 have opposite signs, implying a diminishing marginal effect 
of CEO ownership on corporate giving. We calculate that the sign changes at about 14.07% ownership level.  
19The result suggests a strong time-varying firm effect, which may be due to the sample construction. In contrast to previous 
studies, this study is based on NDCG database and considers more firms and a wider time range. Moreover, it considers total 
contributions, whereas previous studies (e.g., Brown, Helland, and Smith 2006) consider cash contributions. 
 at Queensland University of Technology on November 25, 2014
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
19 
 
is much lower than that of the CEO charity connection. Finally, most firm level control variables (except 
Tobin’s q) are not significant determinants of corporate giving. 
3.1.1 A natural experiment. A common critique of estimated associations of corporate giving and CEO 
attributes, especially CEO ownership, is that they are endogenously determined. In this section, we 
address this issue by exploiting a quasinatural experiment. We use the 2003 dividend tax cut, which 
reduced the personal tax rate on dividend income. Specifically, the dividend tax rate was reduced from a 
maximum rate of 35% to 15% (Chetty and Saez 2005). Because a CEO’s choice of private benefits is 
affected positively by the personal income tax rate, which reduces their cost, and negatively by the CEO’s 
share ownership, which raises the portion of the firm’s cost borne by the CEO, it follows that by cutting 
the personal tax rate on dividends, the Tax Reform Act raises the cost of consuming private benefits, 
especially for CEOs with high share ownership. This is reinforced by a reduction in the top marginal 
personal tax rate from 38.6% to 35%, which is likely to be the marginal rate that most CEOs face. In 
contrast, for shareholder wealth maximization, personal tax rate changes have no predicted effect on 
charitable giving.20 
To compare corporate giving before and after 2003, we plot corporate giving from 1996–2006 as 
a function of CEO ownership quartiles in Figure 2 and present changes in corporate giving after the 2003 
dividend tax cut by CEO ownership quartiles in panel A of Table 3. This analysis reinforces our earlier 
findings that corporate giving decreases with high CEO ownership, but at a decreasing rate. Moreover, we 
find that this convex relation between corporate giving and ownership holds both before and after the 
dividend tax cut year.  
Measuring the effect of the 2003 dividend tax cut on corporate giving, we find the impact is 
concentrated in high ownership quartiles. The marginal effect (measured by the percentage changes in 
corporate giving after 2003 as shown in Table 3, panel A) rises almost linearly over ownership quartiles, 
with the largest fall in corporate giving occurring in the top ownership quartile. On the other hand, we do 
                                                            
20We thank Harrison Hong for suggesting this natural experiment. However, the analysis of the impact of corporate giving 
changes on dividend changes in a later section of this paper is our own extension of the basic experiment. 
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not find a significant effect of the 2003 Tax Reform Act for the firms in the lowest ownership quartile. If 
anything, corporate giving rises after the 2003 tax cut for firms in the lowest ownership quartile. Thus, the 
data indicates the impact of the Tax Reform Act is approximately linear in CEO ownership, suggesting 
wasteful charitable giving in firms with high CEO ownership levels declines after 2003. 
In panel B of Table 3, we estimate the effect of the 2003 dividend tax cut using a multivariate 
regression framework. The main variable of interest is the interaction term CEO ownership x post2003, 
where post2003 is the posttax reform indicator variable. We include post2003 to capture the unconditional 
change in giving and year fixed effects to capture temporal effects such as business cycles, although 
results are similar when we consider the experiment without year fixed effects. Consistent with the 
agency predictions for this, we find that corporate giving declines after the 2003 Tax Reform Act, and this 
effect is stronger as CEO ownership rises. The marginal impact of CEO ownership on corporate giving 
rises by 50% after 2003, which is an economically important effect. This finding is consistent with 
Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2013), who examine the effects of this tax cut on CSR activity and find a 
significant reduction after the tax cut.  
A potential concern with this natural experiment is that there may be time-varying heterogeneity 
in ownership across industries. For example, firms with high and low ownership levels may cluster in 
industries that are on different time trends before and after 2003. To address this type of industry-level 
concern, we repeat the regression analysis with combined industry-year fixed effects, instead of year fixed 
effects, in model 2 of panel B. We find that the marginal effect and statistical significance of CEO 
ownership x post2003 are similar to the model estimates based on year fixed effects. The coefficient of 
post2003 is negative in both models of panel B, but it is statistically significant only in model 1. 
Yet another concern with the natural experiment is that our results may be due to confounding 
macroeconomic effects occurring contemporaneously with the 2003 Tax Reform Act. To address this 
concern, we conduct an analysis of two subsamples similarly affected by concurrent economy-wide 
changes, but for which tax effects are predicted to be stronger or weaker. We expect to observe similar 
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CEO ownership x post2003 estimates if the observed change is due to macroeconomic factors but expect 
significantly different estimates if the Tax Reform Act strongly affects CEO incentives to extract private 
benefits of control through corporate giving as a function of CEO percentage shareholdings. 
In panel C of Table 3, we test the incremental effect of ownership after the Tax Reform Act in 
subsamples of firms in which we expect weaker or stronger private benefit effects of corporate giving, 
namely, at firms with CEO charity ties and firms with high dollar dividend payouts. The 2003 Tax 
Reform Act should have a less pronounced impact on corporate charitable contributions if the marginal 
benefits of corporate giving for CEOs with charity connections continue to exceed the cost of their private 
benefits. On the other hand, the Tax Reform Act effect should be more pronounced in firms that pay large 
dividends as they can now offer greater after-tax dividends for each dollar reduction in corporate giving.  
Consistent with these agency predictions, model 1 estimates the model for firms with CEO ties 
and shows that the coefficient of CEO ownership x post2003 is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
the incremental effect of CEO ownership after the individual dividend tax cut is weaker when CEOs have 
charitable ties. Model 2 examines firms that pay dividends above the sample mean. We document a large 
negative coefficient of CEO ownership x post2003, which is statistically significant. This coefficient 
estimate indicates that the main effect of CEO ownership after the Tax Reform Act is driven by large 
dividend-paying firms, as shareholders of these firms, including CEOs, are more likely to realize tax 
benefits from substituting dividends in place of corporate giving.21  
3.1.2 Subsample analysis. In this subsection, we measure the incremental effects of CEO incentives and 
shareholder wealth-enhancing motives by studying subsamples of firms conditional on whether they are 
more prone to governance problems or more likely to benefit from corporate giving, respectively. First, 
we consider subsamples of firms with stronger or weaker governance structures based on their managerial 
entrenchment (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) and board independence (Hermalin and Weisbach 
                                                            
21In untabulated results, we also find that the effect is weaker for low dividend paying firms. 
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1998) characteristics. This analysis predicts more (less) corporate giving as agency conflicts increase 
(decrease) in samples of firms in which shareholder rights are weakly enforced (strongly enforced).  
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results. In the first model, which considers firms with three or 
more antitakeover defenses as weakly governed firms, we find a more pronounced positive effect of a 
CEO charity connection and a statistically insignificant effect of CEO ownership. Moreover, corporate 
giving in this sample increases with the E-index and decreases with director ownership. In contrast, for 
firms with fewer than three antitakeover defenses, the effects of a CEO charity connection and CEO 
ownership are similar in magnitude to the earlier results.  
Because social dependence cannot be easily measured and Fortune 500 firms typically have a 
large fraction of independent directors (see Panel A, Table 1, this paper and Table 1 of Yermack 2006), 
we classify a board as independent if at least 60% of directors are independent and it has a fully 
independent nominating committee.22 We require a fully independent nominating committee based on the 
recent evidence of Guo and Masulis (2014), who document that the nominating committee has a 
significant incremental effect beyond that of board independence. They attribute the importance of full 
nominating committee independence to outside directors’ fear of not being renominated if they alienate 
the CEO or another officer who is on the nominating committee.  
The third and fourth regression models in panel A examine firms with and without an 
independent board, respectively. The results based on board independence and nonindependence have 
similar economic implications but have opposite signs to those based on the E-index, namely, we find a 
more pronounced effect of a CEO charity connection and a muted effect of CEO ownership for firms with 
nonindependent boards or nominating committees. Taken together, this analysis suggests that agency 
conflicts in corporate giving are a broad-based problem, which is more serious in poorly governed firms. 
                                                            
22The RiskMetrics database does not report nominating board members before 1998, so our subsample analysis is based on the 
1998–2006 period. In a robustness test, we consider the whole sample and define a board as independent if there is at least 70% 
independent outside representation. Our results continue to hold. 
 at Queensland University of Technology on November 25, 2014
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
23 
 
Second, in panel B of Table 4, we consider firm observations with nonmissing data on advertising 
and R&D expenses as these firms are thought to benefit most from corporate giving. The marginal effects 
of CEO charity connection and CEO ownership are 1.61% (p-value = 0.003) and 0.27% (p-value = 
0.061), respectively, which are similar to the estimates based on the full sample. Also, we find that the 
marginal effects of ad-to-sales and R&D-to-sales, the two main variables of shareholder value 
maximization theory, are statistically insignificant (p-values = 0.365 and 0.180, respectively). These 
results cast further doubt on the claim that corporate giving is positively related to shareholder wealth 
maximization. Overall, the results of Table 2, 3, and 4 support the agency hypothesis of corporate giving 
but are generally inconsistent with the firm value maximization motivation for corporate giving. 
3.2 Corporate giving and financial performance 
3.2.1 Equity value of corporate cash holdings. To measure the impact of corporate giving on firm value 
through its impact on cash holding, we employ the cash valuation analysis of Faulkender and Wang 
(2006). Yearly excess stock returns, ri,t - RBi,t, are regressed on changes in firm cash holdings, ∆Cit , and 
on other control variables for various sources and uses of cash flows and several interaction terms of ∆Cit, 
including one with corporate giving. The marginal value that investors place on an additional dollar of 
liquid assets is captured by the coefficient of the change in cash. Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that 
the marginal value of cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital 
markets, and a firm’s preference for cash dividends over stock repurchases. We use their model after 
augmenting it with a measure of corporate giving. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
ri,t - RBi,t= α + β.(corporate giving ratioi,t) + γ.(∆Cit/Mi,t-1 x corporate giving ratioi,t) + δ.(∆Cit/Mi,t-1) + 
θ'.Xi,t + εi,t.                  (2) 
The dependent variable in Equation (2) is firm i’s excess stock return in fiscal year t. As in Faulkender 
and Wang (2006), we calculate excess returns by deducting the Fama-French size and book-to-market 
portfolio returns (RBi,t) from the firm’s raw stock returns (ri,t). As an alternative measure, we calculate 
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excess returns from the firm’s raw stock returns after subtracting the firm’s industry portfolio returns 
(RIndi,t) based on its Fama-French 48 industry.23  
The key explanatory variables are the corporate giving ratio, which is defined as log (1 + 
corporate giving / sales) x 103, and ∆Ci,t, which represents the change in cash from year t-1 to t. ∆Ci,t is 
scaled by the one-year lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). Consistent with Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), the vector X includes changes in earnings (∆Et), changes in net assets (∆NAt), changes in R&D 
(∆RDt), changes in dividend (∆Dt), changes in interest (∆It), one-year lagged cash holdings (Ct-1), 
leverage (Lt), and net equity and debt financing (NFt). All these control variables are scaled by Mi,t-1, with 
the exception of leverage, which is scaled by total assets. X also includes interactions of changes in cash 
with cash holding and leverage. The main coefficient of interest in Equation (2) is γ, which is expected to 
be negative if corporate giving entails inefficient use of cash and greater management rent extraction. 
Panels A and B of Table 5 present summary statistics and regression estimates, respectively. 
Summary statistics are based on the Fortune 500 firms having data available from Compustat and CRSP. 
Because our sample represents relatively large firms, the summary statistics in panel A differ from those 
of Faulkender and Wang (2006). For example, in our sample, the change in cash divided by market value 
of equity has a mean (median) of 2.8% (0.6%), whereas in Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) sample, it has a 
mean (median) of 0.4% (-0.01%). 
Panel B of Table 5 presents regression estimates for the two alternate specifications of excess 
returns. We find a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of corporate 
giving and the change in cash for both excess stock return specifications. This relation is also 
economically important. For example, in model 1 the equity value of cash is approximately 8.1 cents 
lower if a firm changes its total giving from the sample median to the 75th percentile level. Untabulated 
analysis shows that the negative impact of corporate giving on firm value rises from -8.1 cents to -20.4 
                                                            
23We consider the universe of Fortune 500 firms to calculate average industry returns based on the argument that they constitute 
the sample of closest comparables. Later in robustness tests, we also consider the universe of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ exchanges. These results are very similar. 
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cents for a sample of firms with nonindependent boards in which board oversight is expected to be 
weaker. These results suggest that managers extract private benefits from corporate cash holdings in firms 
that make large charitable contributions. Because investors perceive such manager benefits to be costly to 
the firm, they place a lower value on each extra dollar of cash the firm holds. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that corporate giving impinges on a firm’s financial performance. Other explanatory 
variables in panel B have signs and explanatory power consistent with those of Faulkender and Wang 
(2006). 
In the above analysis, corporate giving is set equal to zero if firms do not voluntarily disclose 
direct giving and do not make donations to their foundations. This procedure is appropriate if these 
nonreporting firms make negligible contributions. We view this as a reasonable operating assumption 
because (1) the NDCG database only contains charitable contributions that are verified by the companies 
or compiled from reliable public records and (2) contribution recipients are typically tax-exempt 
institutions that must disclose their revenue sources in IRS Form 990-PF filings, which are available for 
public inspection.24 Nevertheless, we perform two robustness tests to validate the earlier findings. 
As our first robustness test, we assign the sample’s median value to any missing corporate giving 
ratio, which we set equal to zero in our earlier analysis. Results of this analysis are similar to the earlier 
findings. Specifically, the interaction term corporate giving ratio x ∆Cit/Mi,t-1 estimate is -0.197 (p-value = 
0.022) when stock returns are adjusted for size and book-to-market portfolio returns (i.e., model 1) and 
missing corporate giving values are replaced with their sample median. As a second approach, whenever 
corporate giving ratio is missing, we exclude the observation since there is substantial uncertainty as to 
whether a firm has actually contributed. In the reduced sample of 1,541 firm-year observations, the results 
continue to be qualitatively similar to our main findings. For example, the coefficient of the interaction 
                                                            
24When collecting data, we find that firms use direct giving very infrequently. For example, Coca-Cola contributed $37.48 and 
$7.52 million in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and Microsoft contributed $107.12 and $246.90 million in 1998 and 2002, 
respectively. For these firms, it is reasonable to assign zero direct giving for the other years. 
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term is -0.192 (p-value = 0.036) for size and book-to-market adjusted stock returns. This additional 
robustness analysis also indicates that sample selection is not driving our cash valuation results. 
3.2.2 Dividends and corporate giving. In Section 3.1.1, we found that corporate giving declines after the 
2003 Tax Reform Act. However, we did not investigate whether the firms that subsequently reduce 
corporate giving are also increasing cash dividend payments. We now perform this latter analysis. 
Specifically, we specify a dividend payment model similar to that of Chetty and Saez (2005), with the 
addition of a firm’s dollar level of charitable contributions and its interaction with the post2003 indicator 
variable. Under an agency theoretic view of corporate giving, the interaction term total contributions ($) x 
post2003 is predicted to have a negative coefficient in this specification. 
Examining firms that make charitable contributions in 2002, Table 6 shows the relation between 
changes in charitable contributions and post-2003 changes in dollar dividends. Specifically, we find that 
the coefficient of total contributions ($) x post2003 is negative and statistically significant in models with 
and without the control variables, consistent with the agency theory prediction. Economically, a $1 
million reduction in corporate giving after the Tax Reform Act is associated with $6.4 million to $10.2 
million increase in cash dividends, based on the model 1 and 2 estimates from Table 6. We find support 
for the 2003 dividend tax cut significantly curbing managerial consumption of private benefits in the form 
of charitable giving, which helps fund cash dividend increases. 
Turning to the control variables, we see in regression model 2 that they have signs consistent with 
prior research and are generally statistically significant. Similar to Chetty and Saez (2005), we find that 
the coefficient of post2003 is positive and statistically significant only when the regression model excludes 
the control variables.25 We also find that the coefficients of total contributions ($) and its interaction with 
the post2003 indicator remain statistically significant. 
3.3  The channels of value destruction 
                                                            
25Chetty and Saez (2005) argue that high dividend paying firms are extremely concentrated, making the estimate of the tax 
response fragile when control variables are added. 
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Thus far, the evidence suggests that corporate giving is a manifestation of agency conflicts that 
reduce firm value. Next, we examine specific channels through which corporate giving destroys value. 
3.3.1 CEO-affiliated contributions. CEO-affiliated charitable contributions refer to firm contributions to 
nonprofit organizations in which the CEO is a director, trustee, or advisor or holds some other official 
position. The following analysis requires the names of CEO-affiliated charities and firm contribution 
levels to these charities during the CEO’s tenure in office. The primary data sources for CEO charity 
affiliations are the biographical sections of annual reports, Businessweek, and Forbes. The main data 
source for the charity names and levels of corporate giving is the Foundation Directory Online database, 
which is available from 2004. This database tracks all donations distributed by firm-sponsored 
foundations but includes only a partial list of donations distributed to charities by corporations because 
these disclosures are voluntary. As a consequence, a caveat of this analysis is that reported CEO-affiliated 
contributions almost surely underestimate actual contributions. Because this two-way data-matching 
process is highly labor intensive, we focus on the Fortune 100 CEOs in 2006.26 
Table 7 presents evidence on CEO-affiliated corporate giving. Panel A reports that about 82% of 
CEOs are affiliated with one or more nonprofit organizations, whereas 62% (or 76% conditional on a 
CEO having a nonprofit affiliation) of firms make donations to CEO-affiliated organizations. These 
statistics suggest that corporate contributions to CEO-affiliated charities are widespread, even given the 
incomplete nature of our corporate charitable contributions data. Panel B examines whether such 
contributions are economically large. We find that the average annual firm (total) contributions to CEO-
affiliated charities across the Fortune 100 firms in our 2004–2010 sample period is $2.5 ($154.4) million, 
which equals 15.7% of average annual CEO compensation and represents an annual cost to the 
corporation of approximately $675,000. Comparing this result with existing studies shows that CEO-
                                                            
26 To illustrate data collection on affiliated contributions, consider the case of Mr. Miles D. White, the CEO of Abbott 
Laboratories. Mr. White is on the board of trustees at The Field Museum in Chicago, the Museum of Science and Industry, the 
Lyric Opera of Chicago, Joffrey Ballet of Chicago, The Culver Educational Foundation, Art Institute of Chicago, and 
Northwestern University. After identifying these affiliated nonprofits, we search the Foundation Directory Online database to 
check whether they receive donations from Abbott. We find that all nonprofits, except The Culver Education Foundation, 
received a total of $15.2 million from 2004 to 2010. 
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affiliated charitable contributions are greater than the combined costs of corporate jet use and other perks 
(see Table 2 in Yermack 2006) and are similar in magnitude to both CEO personal donations through 
family foundations (Yermack 2009) and CEO cash severance payments (Rusticus 2006).27  
In Table 7, panel C, we estimate a tobit regression of CEO-affiliated contributions on CEO 
attributes, firm size, and indicators for industries most likely to benefit from giving. The analysis 
indicates more affiliated giving in firms when CEO ownership is low or, equivalently, when CEO 
financial interests are less aligned with shareholders. These regression results also suggest more CEO-
affiliated giving occurs in relatively larger firms and firms in regulated industries. 
In summary, the evidence reported here on CEO-affiliated contributions documents a new form 
of rent extraction. Earlier studies document rent extraction through many avenues, such as excessive 
compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004), option backdating (Heron and Lie 2007), and the use of 
corporate jets (Yermack 2006). While there are clear conflict-of-interest concerns given that CEO-
affiliated contributions are economically large and managers can accrue private benefits from these 
contributions, the SEC does not currently require firms to disclose this information to shareholders, 
except in the special case of charity awards, described in the next section.  
3.3.2 Charity awards. Charitable award arrangements allow firms to contribute in the name of its 
officers and directors for the benefit of a charity of their choice, and this typically occurs at the conclusion 
of their service to the company. As a part of its reform of proxy rules on compensation, the SEC 
mandated that publicly listed firms disclose the names of executives and directors associated with 
charitable awards or legacy programs beginning in October 1992. We use the data generated by this 
reporting requirement to study how shareholders reacted to charity awards. If shareholders believe that 
firms can attract desirable executives and board members who are instrumental in safeguarding their 
interests, then stock prices should react positively to news of these awards. Alternatively, if shareholders 
                                                            
27Yermack (2009) reports that CEOs and chairmen donate an average of $1.7 million through their family foundations over the 
two-and-a-half year period, whereas Yermack (2006) documents annual perk consumption of $216,000 that includes jet use, 
financial counseling, car transportation, club fees, etc. 
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perceive charity awards as symptomatic of entrenched managers extracting rents, then stock prices should 
react negatively when firms report charity awards in proxy statements for the first time. 
Because the SEC’s EDGAR Web site reports proxy statements starting in 1994, we rely on 
microfiche files stored at Vanderbilt University to gather data on proxy filing dates in 1993. In our sample 
of Fortune 500 firms, fifty-three firms disclose charity awards in which at least one director (excluding 
the CEO) has an affiliation from 1993–2010. We focus on these companies to study the stock price 
reactions when a charity award is first disclosed to shareholders.28 
Abnormal stock returns are presented in Figure 2 and Table 8. We use a firm’s proxy filing date 
as the event day, although we recognize that investors may not obtain immediate access to this 
information due to delays in shareholders receiving mailed proxy statements. If a firm files a preliminary 
proxy statement before the final filing, then the preliminary statement filing date is used (Yermack 2006). 
Firm-level abnormal returns are calculated using standard event-study methodology and alternative 
market adjustment procedures. For parsimony, we report results based on the Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor model, although we obtain similar results using other standard market adjustment procedures. 
Figure 2 presents average CARs for the ten trading days (or two weeks) prior to the event day through to 
the ten trading days after the event. The abnormal returns for the sample are distributed around zero up to 
the proxy filing date and then begin to trend downward.29 
As shown in panel A of Table 8, the mean CAR over event window [+1, +3] is -0.87% and is 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.014. We reach a similar conclusion using a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. In untabulated analysis, we exclude the two firms that made other major news announcements 
over the [+1, +3] event window and find very similar results for the remaining sample. These findings 
indicate that shareholders react negatively to insider-affiliated giving. This economic loss far exceeds the 
                                                            
28Research on managerial rent extraction often scrutinizes proxy disclosures of questionable expense items. For example, 
Yermack (2006) studies CEO personal use of corporate jets, and Wei and Yermack (2011) study CEO’s inside debt.  
29Yermack (2009) documents price declines on event day one when investigating stock returns on news of executive stock gifts. 
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value of charitable award programs announced and is likely to reflect the market’s assessment of the 
expected future costs of additional contributions to charities. 
In panel B of Table 8, we present regression analysis of stock price reactions to charity awards as 
a function of CEO ownership, CEO charity connection, and fraction of independent directors. We 
document a statistically significant negative coefficient for a CEO charity connection (p-value = 0.027), 
indicating more pronounced negative reactions when a CEO has a charity interest. CEO ownership has a 
statistically significant positive coefficient (p-value = 0.060), which suggests shareholders react less 
negatively to charity awards disclosures if CEO interests are more aligned with shareholders. Fraction of 
independent directors has a positive coefficient, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
3.3.3 Donations to charities versus donations to company-sponsored foundations. Firms can directly 
contribute to charities or make donations to their sponsored foundations. In both cases, firms are not 
required by state or SEC regulations to disclose giving information (Kahn 1997). However, foundations 
are obligated to report all their activities annually on IRS Form 990-PF. Thus, databases on foundation 
giving (Foundation Directory online and NDCG) contain complete information on corporate contributions 
made to foundations. Data on individual firms’ direct giving is from the NDCG directory, which reports 
contributions voluntarily verified by the companies themselves or compiled from reliable sources. With 
this data, we examine the intensity of agency problems across these two channels of corporate giving. 
Agency problems are likely to be more severe for contributions transferred to foundations for 
several reasons. First, the economic and accounting effects of foundation giving do not occur 
simultaneously. The economic effect of foundation giving takes place when foundations ultimately 
contribute to charities, whereas the accounting effect takes place when firms legally transfer donations to 
foundations. Petrovits (2006) argues that this timing lag offers opportunistic managers an opportunity to 
time the transfer of funds to foundations by managing corporate earnings and to make it less transparent 
which particular charities ultimately receive contributions. Second, company-sponsored foundations 
cannot redistribute any of its assets back to company or its shareholders, so any foundation donations 
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represent a permanent loss of firm assets for uncertain future benefits, which can harm shareholders. 
Third, foundation monitoring is performed by representatives of sponsoring firms (Fama and Jensen 
1983). Absent residual claimants and external monitoring, but with considerable control over foundation 
boards through their influence over foundation board appointments (Carter and Werbel 2002), CEOs can 
use foundation assets in ways that are inconsistent with value maximization, but instead benefit their 
preferred charities. Finally, the public may discount any positive reputation benefits of foundation 
contributions given that a firm is only indirectly involved in the actual distribution of charitable giving, 
and there are generally significant delays in making these contributions, so the positive publicity benefits 
to the firm are likely to be small. 
Table 9 analyzes annual program giving and foundation giving where these two forms of giving 
are separately analyzed in two separate tobit regressions specified in Equation (1). The model 1 estimates 
program giving and shows that firms with more reputable CEOs in terms of tenure and outside 
appointment and better governance measured by a higher fraction of independent directors and non-CEO 
director ownership are more likely to donate directly to charities annually. Moreover, we find that CEO 
charity interests are less likely to be a significant determinant of a firm’s major direct annual giving. On 
the other hand, model 2 analyzes foundation giving and shows that it tends to occur when governance is 
weaker, as measured by a lower director ownership and a higher E-index level. Interestingly, the marginal 
effects of CEO ownership are similar for both annual program giving and foundation giving. Taken 
together, this evidence indicates that transfers of corporate resources to foundations are more prone to 
agency conflicts than annual program giving, which publicly disclose specific charity donations.  
3.3.4 Corporate giving and CEO compensation. The evidence uncovered thus far is consistent with 
managerial rent extraction being a motivation for corporate giving. However, this argument may be 
weakened if firms adjust the compensation contracts of their senior executives who benefit from corporate 
charitable contributions (Fama 1980). To explore this question, we estimate a firm and year fixed effect 
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model of CEO compensation that takes into account CEO-affiliated corporate giving as specified in 
Equation (3). 
Log (CEO compensationit) = α + β.(Corporate givingit) + γ.Xit + fi + yt + εit ,       (3) 
where i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. For the dependent variable, we calculate the natural 
logarithm of CEO compensation (total of salary, bonus, restricted stocks, Black-Scholes-valued stock 
options, long-term incentives, etc.) to reduce its right skewness. The main explanatory variable of interest 
is corporate giving. The covariate X is a vector consisting of firm-level characteristics (logarithm of 
assets, stock return, ROA, volatility), CEO attributes (CEO tenure and outside appointment status), and 
firm-level governance characteristics (board size, fraction of independent directors, director ownership, 
and the E-index). The terms fi and yt refer to firm and year fixed effects, respectively. 
Table 10 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (3). Specifically, it presents coefficient 
estimates of the associations of total corporate giving (model 1) as well as its two components: annual 
program giving and foundation giving and CEO compensation (models 2 and 3, respectively). In these 
three models, we find statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for corporate giving. While the 
optimal contracting theory of Fama (1980) predicts a statistically significant negative relation between 
CEO compensation and corporate giving, our results suggest that CEO compensation is not reduced for 
the private benefits of corporate giving, which supports an agency theory perspective on corporate giving. 
A potential concern with the OLS estimation of Equation (3) is that corporate giving is 
endogenous. To mitigate this concern, we estimate an instrumental variables (IV) model with three state-
level instruments based on a firm’s headquarters state to predict the corporate giving level. While we 
leave the details of this approach to the Internet Appendix, we summarize the findings here. The state-
level instruments are the density of high net worth individuals, average individual charitable contributions 
as a fraction of gross income, and recent natural disasters in the firm’s headquarters state, all of which are 
described in detail in the Internet Appendix.  
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In the first-stage regressions, the coefficient estimates of the first two instruments are positive as 
expected, although not statistically significant, possibly because of their low time-series variability. 
However, the coefficient of the natural disaster indicator is negative and highly significant, implying that 
firms contribute less when a state affected by a natural disaster is also the location of the firm’s 
headquarters. This suggests that firm operations are often disrupted by the disaster and that we need to 
control for this potential outcome. Many arguments can be offered in favor of this finding. Firms reduce 
community assistance programs if their operations are adversely affected, if they expect sales to declines, 
etc.  
On the other hand, we expect operationally unaffected firms that are headquartered in a state hit 
by a natural disaster to contribute more. When we include an interaction term between ROA and the 
natural disaster indicator, we find that a 10% increase in firm ROA in a state hit by a disaster raises the 
total giving ratio by 39%. We also estimate similar first-stage regression specifications but consider 
annual program and foundation giving separately to identify the relative impacts on the two forms of 
corporate giving. The evidence suggests that program giving is more sensitive to natural disasters. 
Relative to foundation giving, program giving falls to a greater extent (by 42.2%). However, firms not 
directly affected by these disasters are likely to be 21.4% more responsive in terms of subsequent 
program giving. This finding regarding program giving is consistent with the views of industry experts 
and is suggestive of the relevance of natural disaster as an instrument. The first-stage regression 
estimates document important associations between corporate giving and state-level variables and as such 
make a significant contribution to the philanthropy literature. 
In the second-stage regressions, we find a statistically significant positive relation between CEO 
compensation and the instrumented corporate giving. Economically, a 10% increase in total corporate 
giving raises CEO compensation by $504,133 (above its $6.5 million mean value). Although this finding 
supports the managerial power hypothesis, which states that CEOs have power to extract excess rents, we 
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must caution the reader that these instruments may fail the exclusion requirement, which can lead to 
biased second-stage estimates. 
3.3.5 Outside director charitable interests and corporate giving. In this section, we analyze the 
relation between independent director charity interests and corporate giving. The existing literature 
suggests that managers build reputation with stakeholders through the use of corporate giving and CSR 
activities. For example, Galaskiewicz (1985, 1997) finds that CEOs make valuable connections with local 
elites when their firms make charitable contributions, and Cespa and Cestone (2007) assert that CEOs use 
CSR activities strategically to build relations with social and environmental activists, who offer CEOs 
favorable treatment during future turnover decisions. We argue that a more direct form of entrenchment 
occurs when CEOs strategically support making firm donations to independent director charitable 
interests. For this purpose, we analyze whether firms support charitable donations when independent 
directors have ties to nonprofits and then evaluate the effect of this alignment on CEO compensation. This 
analysis is in the same spirit as Hwang and Kim (2009), who find that a CEO’s social ties with 
independent directors result in excessive CEO compensation. The analysis here differs from theirs in the 
sense that this study considers the social ties to independent directors that are created by targeted 
corporate giving. 
We again focus on Fortune 500 firms from 2005–2006 and obtain information on independent 
director charitable affiliations from company proxy statements. Panel A of Table 11 presents evidence on 
the relation between independent director charity interests and corporate giving to specific charities. We 
measure director charity interests in the same way we measure CEO charity interests, namely, being a 
director, trustee, or advisor or holding some other official position in the nonprofit organizations. We find 
that 64% of independent directors with charitable affiliations are associated with educational institutions, 
47% are associated with miscellaneous philanthropic organizations, 22% are associated with arts and 
cultural organizations, etc. For the same set of firms, we identify each firm’s top three charities that 
receive corporate contributions of at least $1 million in 2005 and 2006. Of all firms making charitable 
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contributions, 32% contribute to educational institutions, 28% contribute to health and human services, 
24% contribute to philanthropic organizations, and 18% support arts and culture as one of their top three 
charity recipients. After combining these two data sources, we find that of the firms that make charitable 
contributions, 68.8% have an overlap between the firm’s independent director interests and the firm’s top 
three supported charities. 
We examine the association between independent director charitable interests receiving corporate 
support and CEO compensation in panel B of Table 11 from 2005–2006 to assess whether corporate 
giving benefits CEOs. Specifically, we regress CEO compensation on an indicator for a director 
supported cause by considering a sample of firms with and without independent boards. Director 
supported cause takes a value of one if at least one of the three major causes supported by corporate 
giving matches at least one independent director’s charity interests, and zero otherwise. If CEOs do not 
benefit from supporting independent director causes, then no association between compensation and a 
director supported cause should be observed. Contrary to this prediction, we find in model 1 of panel B a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (p-value = 0.035) of director supported cause for firms 
with independent boards. Yet, for firms without independent boards shown in model 2, it exhibits an 
insignificant coefficient. Thus, increasing entrenchment effect is only applicable in firms with nominally 
independent boards. This evidence suggests corporate giving is strategically used to build social ties 
between CEOs and independent directors, which can tangibly compromise director independence and 
lead to further CEO benefits, such as excess compensation  
3.4 Robustness 
As robustness analysis, we re-estimate all our prior regressions after Compustat, CRSP, 
RiskMetrics, Execucomp, and corporate giving data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The 
statistical significance of both CEO charity connection and CEO ownership remain unchanged in the logit 
and tobit regression specifications reported in Table 2. Moreover, there is evidence of a greater negative 
impact of CEO ownership on contributions transferred to foundations (relative to the model 2 of Table 9). 
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As a further test, we censor corporate giving data at the top 1% level and find very similar results. We 
also estimate a cross-sectional model of the amount of corporate giving by averaging the dependent and 
explanatory variables from Table 2 over the sample period. Our results continue to support the agency 
theory hypothesis. In further robust analysis, we exclude firms in the financial industry as these firms 
often sponsor local charities as a form of advertising. We find a more pronounced effect of CEO 
ownership on corporate giving in the reduced sample of 2,083 firm-year observations. 
We also control for important corporate governance measures, including dual class shares, a 
CEO-founder or founding family member, a fully independent nominating committee, and outside 
blockholder-directors (outside directors holding 5% or more of firm stock). Using logit and tobit models, 
our analysis yields statistically insignificant coefficients on all of these measures. We also replace the 
fraction of independent directors with an independent board indicator variable and replace a firm’s E-
index first with its G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) and then with a classified board indicator. 
These variables also yield insignificant coefficient estimates. 
The evidence on equity value of cash holdings is re-estimated using two alternative approaches. 
First, excess returns are calculated by subtracting a firm’s Fama-French 48 industry return, where the 
whole Compustat universe of firms is used for robustness. The coefficient of ∆Cit/Mi,t-1 x corporate giving 
ratioi,t (γ) is -0.203 and remains significant with a p-value of 0.011. Second, it could be argued that 
unobserved risk components of giving firms are different from those of firms that make no charitable 
contributions. We re-estimate the regression model of excess returns with firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved idiosyncratic risks. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term of the change in cash and 
the corporate giving ratio from Equation (2) is -0.17 and is significant with a p-value of 0.026. One may 
also suspect that certain firms with low marginal values of cash are more apt to make charitable 
contributions. However, in firm fixed effect regressions, this issue should have no effect on excess stock 
returns because a firm’s time-invariant marginal value of cash is controlled for. 
4. Conclusion 
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This study clearly shows that CEOs gain from corporate giving. The data indicates that 62% of 
firms contribute to CEO-affiliated charities, with more affiliated contributions in firms in which CEO 
financial interests are less aligned with shareholders. CEOs also appear to opportunistically transfer 
contributions to foundations, and these large transfers reduce shareholder cash flow rights. Furthermore, 
CEOs substitute cash dividends for corporate giving when a dividend tax cut increases a CEO’s personal 
cost of consuming private benefits of control. CEOs also appear to use corporate giving strategically to 
support charities in which independent directors have affiliations, possibly strengthening the CEO’s social 
bonds with these directors and thereby weakening board independence. Various regression specifications 
confirm that corporate giving is not purely a firm value maximizing tool but is a manifestation of 
managerial-shareholder agency problem in which managers have considerable influence over how and 
where corporate contributions are channeled. Such forms of corporate giving serve the personal interests 
of CEOs and compromise the independence of outside directors and result in lower stock returns. 
The results reported here raise doubts about optimal contracting models of corporate executives, 
where both principals and agents have ambiguous discretionary spending objectives, especially when 
public disclosure of this discretionary spending is not required. One implication of this analysis is that an 
SEC requirement to promptly disclose insider-affiliated corporate giving could help limit this activity and 
thereby benefit outside minority shareholders. Several interesting avenues of research remain unexplored. 
First, employee matching grant programs are quite common, but do they enable firms to hire and retain 
higher quality employees? If yes, then does this increase firm profitability? Or are matching programs 
part of a long held cultural tradition? Second, legal professionals tend to differentiate corporate giving 
from CSR activity, although many companies “claim to have embraced CSR and then point to the glossy 
reports of their company foundation [grants] to demonstrate the degree of their commitment” (Altschuller 
2010), highlighting that one major form of CSR for many firms is corporate giving. Future research might 
examine whether shareholders understand such distinctions and demand that firms pursue activities that 
better position them competitively.  
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Appendix A. List of Legislatorial Proposals for Corporate Giving Disclosure 
There have been several efforts by legislators to enforce disclosure of corporate giving data. We 
list such events below. 
1. Republican Congressman Paul Gillmor introduced H.R. 944 and H.R. 945 to the House of 
Representatives in 1997. This bill excluded disclosure requirements for contributions made to 
educational institutions and local charities. However, this bill empowered shareholders to vote on 
corporate giving. 
2. After the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other companies, some policy makers tried to 
enforce stringent disclosure requirements on corporate giving. Consequently, the first draft of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 passed by the House required firms to disclose such information 
(Petrovits 2006). 
3. On February 13, 2002, Paul Gillmor again introduced a bill, H.R. 3745. This bill required 
disclosure requirements for substantial contributions made to insider-affiliated charities.  
4. Later in February 2002, Democrat John LaFalce introduced H.R. 3818, which restricts firms 
from providing charitable contributions to any group affiliated with directors. This bill also 
required information disclosure for officers and their immediate family members if they sit on the 
boards of nonprofit organizations, independent of whether the organization received any 
charitable contributions from these firms. 
5. Eventually, corporate giving disclosure clauses were added in the Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act (CAARTA), sponsored by Republican 
Michael Oxley. Faced with opposition from the Council on Foundations and the Independent 
Sector, this aspect of firm disclosure was dropped in the final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Cohen 2002). 
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Appendix B. Criteria for Coding of Corporate Giving Data 
We maintain the following criteria for coding purposes. 
1. If the directory (NDCG) only reports information on a firm’s giving program or its foundation 
without stating the amount of giving, the contribution through program or foundation is recorded 
as zero. 
2. A firm may have several foundations that can transfer money among themselves. Because such 
transfers are not new donations, we exclude them from the total amount of money foundations 
receive in a year. 
3. Company-sponsored public foundations are not included as they usually have other donors and 
the total amount of giving for a specific firm cannot be easily separated from that of others. 
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Appendix C: Definition of variables 
Variable Definitions 
Determinants of corporate giving decisions 
CEO attributes  
CEO charity connection Equals 1 if the CEO is related to nonprofit organizations, e.g., academic institutions, arts 
and culture, animal/wildlife and environment organizations, nonprofit charitable 
organizations, civil rights organizations, think tanks, and research centers. Source: 
biographical sections of annual reports, Businessweek, Forbes and www.nndb.com. 
CEO ownership ே௢.௢௙ ஼ாை ௦௛௔௥௘௦
்௢௧௔௟	௦௛௔௥௘௦ ௢௨௧௦௧௔௡ௗ௜௡௚ +
ே௢.௢௙ ஼ாை ௢௣௧௜௢௡௦
்௢௧௔௟ ௦௛௔௥௘௦ ௢௨௧௦௧௔௡ௗ௜௡௚ ∗ ݈݀݁ݐܽ . Calculation follows Core and 
Guay’s (1999) methodology. 
Tenure The current fiscal year minus the year when the CEO joined the company. Source: 
Execucomp; when missing, Businessweek and www.nndb.com. 
 
Governance variables  
Board size The logarithm of total number of board members. 
CEO-chair duality An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO is also the chairman and 0 
otherwise. 
Director ownership The summation of share ownership by all non-CEO directors at a firm. 
E-index This is as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and comprises of classified 
board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pill, golden parachute, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. 
Fraction of independent directors The number of independent directors divided by board size. 
Outside appointment Equals 1 if the CEO is recruited from outside. 
Profit maximizing variables  
Ad-to-sales Advertising expenses / sales. 
Ad indicator Equals 0 if the data is missing in Compustat and 1 otherwise. 
Asset Log(1 + firm’s asset) where firm asset is expressed in millions. 
Marginal tax rate Simulated corporate marginal tax rates. Source: Graham and Mills (1998). 
Number of employees Log(1 + number of employees) where the number of employees is in thousands. 
Number of shareholders Log(1 + number of shareholders) where the number of shareholders is in thousands. 
R&D-to-sales R&D expenses / sales. 
R&D indicator Equals 0 if the data in Compustat is missing and 1 otherwise. 
Firm characteristics  
Assets-to-employee Assets / number of employees. 
Free cash flow Income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization – capital expenditure. 
Free cash flow indicator Equals 1 if free cash flow is greater than 0. 
Leverage Total long-term debt / total assets. 
Tobin’s q (Total assets – total common equity + annual closing price (fiscal) x common shares 
outstanding) / total assets. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation / assets. 
Industries  
Financial industry Banking + insurance + trading. 
Non-environmentally-friendly 
industry 
Steel works + non-metallic and industrial metal mining + coal + petroleum and natural 
gas + SICs between 0800 and 0899 (forestry) + 2810 and 2819 (industrial inorganic 
chemicals) + 2400-2439 (lumber and wood products). 
Pharmaceutical industry Medical equipments + pharmaceutical products. 
Regulated industry Utilities + communication. 
Retail industry Food products + consumer goods + apparel + retail. 
Sin industry Beer & liquor + tobacco products + defense. 
Natural experiment 
 
Post2003 Equals 1 for years 2003 to 2006 (dividend tax cut years) and 0 otherwise. 
Corporate giving and the value of cash 
∆Ct Changes in cash. 
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∆Dt Changes in common dividends. ∆Et Changes in earnings before extraordinary items. 
∆It Changes in interests. ∆NAt Changes in net assets. 
∆RDt  Changes in R&D. 
Ct-1 Level of cash. 
Lt All debt / Market value of total assets. 
NFt New equity issues + Net new debt issues. 
R Cumulative stock returns over a year. 
RB Fama-French size and book-to-market matched yearly portfolio returns. Source: Kenneth 
French’s website. 
RInd Fama-French 48 industry portfolio returns. 
CEO compensation and corporate giving 
Board size The logarithm of total number of board members. 
Director ownership The summation of share ownership by all non-CEO directors at a firm. 
E-index This is as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and comprises of classified 
board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pill, golden parachute, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. 
Independent board indicator Takes the value of 1 if at least 60% of board members are independent and the firm has a 
fully independent nominating committee. 
Log(assets) Log(1 + firm’s asset) where firm asset is expressed in millions. 
Outside appointment An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is recruited from outside. If 
CEO’s joining year precedes the year of employment as CEO, we calculate outside as 1. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation / assets. 
Stock return The cumulative stock return during the year. 
Tenure as CEO Equals current year – appointment year as CEO. 
Total compensation Log(TDC1) where TDC1 = salary + bonus + restricted stocks + stock options (Black-
Scholes value) + long-term incentives + others. 
Total giving ratio Log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103. Program and foundation giving ratios are 
similarly calculated. 
Volatility 1-year variance of stock returns. 
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Figure 1 
Corporate giving in the United States 
Total charitable contributions of publicly listed Fortune 500 firms and all corporations in the United States. Data on 
Fortune 500 firms are collected from the National Directory of Corporate Giving, whereas data on all corporate 
contributions are from the Giving USA reports. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Corporate giving, CEO ownership, and the 2003 Tax Reform Act 
Average corporate giving for Fortune 500 firms from 1996–2006, as a function CEO ownership quartiles.
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Figure 3 
Charity award announcement abnormal stock returns 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for the first disclosure of charity awards. The sample consists of fifty-three 
firms whose proxy statements are investigated from 1993–2010. Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model. Confidence bounds at the 95% level are plotted as dotted lines. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
Program contribution (million) 2.470 21.900 0 0 0 0 0.185 
Foundation contribution (million) 6.514 21.600 0 0 0.046 4.000 13.525 
Total contribution (million) 8.984 32.300 0 0 0.406 5.480 17.600 
CEO attributes     
CEO charity connection 0.714 0.452 0 0 1 1 1 
Ownership (%) 1.760 3.836 0.142 0.318 0.666 1.477 3.333 
Tenure (years) 18.022 11.993 3 7 17 28 35 
Outside appointment 0.215 0.411 0 0 0 0 1 
Governance variables     
Board size 11.252 2.590 8 9 11 13 15 
Fraction of independent directors 0.711 0.156 0.500 0.615 0.733 0.833 0.900 
Director ownership (%) 0.778 4.085 0.002 0.022 0.072 0.226 0.746 
CEO-chairman duality 0.873 0.333 0 1 1 1 1 
E-index 1.575 1.122 0 1 2 2 3 
Profit maximizing variables     
Ad-to-sales 0.012 0.026 0 0 0 0.013 0.040 
R&D-to-sales 0.020 0.047 0 0 0 0.019 0.062 
Assets (log) 9.481 1.319 7.928 8.527 9.381 10.233 11.278 
Number of employees (log) 3.416 1.072 2.116 2.717 3.401 4.078 4.812 
Number of shareholders (log) 3.231 1.581 1.068 2.166 3.329 4.223 5.204 
Marginal tax rate 0.333 0.059 0.300 0.347 0.350 0.350 0.355 
 Firm characteristics     
Leverage 0.182 0.143 0.025 0.071 0.148 0.268 0.370 
ROA 0.135 0.078 0.035 0.084 0.127 0.184 0.236 
Tobin’s q 1.902 1.267 1.058 1.168 1.455 2.139 3.237 
Free cash flow indicator 0.863 0.344 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Observations  2,421 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Name No. % of sample Name No. % of sample 
Agriculture 3 0.12% Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 7 0.29% 
Food 84 3.47% Defense 8 0.33% 
Soda 12 0.50% Precious metals 5 0.21% 
Beer 34 1.40% Nonmetallic and industrial metal mining 7 0.29% 
Smoke 13 0.54% Coal 6 0.25% 
Toys 8 0.33% Oil 103 4.25% 
Fun 0 0.00% Utilities 224 9.25% 
Printing and publishing 21 0.87% Communication 60 2.48% 
Consumer goods 71 2.93% Personal services 8 0.33% 
Apparel 23 0.95% Business services 101 4.17% 
Healthcare 30 1.24% Computers 79 3.26% 
Medical equipment 34 1.40% Electronic equipment 92 3.80% 
Pharmaceutical products 73 3.02% Measuring and control equipment 13 0.54% 
Chemicals 76 3.14% Business supplies 60 2.48% 
Rubber and plastic products 0 0.00% Shipping containers 9 0.37% 
Textiles 7 0.29% Transportation 63 2.60% 
Construction materials 31 1.28% Wholesale 100 4.13% 
Construction 57 2.35% Retail 260 10.74% 
Steel works 32 1.32% Restaurants, hotels, motels 44 1.82% 
Fabricated products 0 0.00% Banking 152 6.28% 
Machinery 87 3.59% Insurance 142 5.87% 
Electrical equipment 27 1.12% Real estate 0 0.00% 
Automobiles and trucks 57 2.35% Trading 36 1.49% 
Aircraft 34 1.40% Other 28 1.16% 
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Panel C: Univariate comparisons of giving and nongiving firms 
 Noncontributing Contributing Difference  
p-value of 
difference 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection 0.565 0.496 0.815 0.388 -0.250*** 0.000 
Ownership (%) 2.179 4.027 1.471 3.672 0.708*** 0.000 
Tenure (years) 17.293 11.990 18.524 11.974 -1.231** 0.013 
Outside appointment 0.231 0.422 0.204 0.404 0.027 0.120 
Governance variables       
Board size 10.673 2.571 11.651 2.528 -0.978*** 0.000 
Fraction of independent directors 0.698 0.162 0.719 0.152 -0.021*** 0.000 
Director ownership (%) 1.070 4.968 0.577 3.333 0.493*** 0.007 
CEO-chairman duality 0.857 0.350 0.884 0.320 -0.027* 0.053 
E-index 1.580 1.108 1.572 1.132 0.008 0.868 
Profit maximizing variables       
Ad-to-sales 0.010 0.024 0.014 0.027 -0.004*** 0.000 
R&D-to-sales 0.018 0.044 0.022 0.049 -0.004* 0.062 
Assets (log) 9.084 1.154 9.754 1.356 -0.670*** 0.000 
Number of employees (log) 3.133 0.983 3.610 1.087 -0.477*** 0.000 
Number of shareholders (log) 2.804 1.575 3.525 1.518 -0.721*** 0.000 
Marginal tax rate 0.329 0.064 0.335 0.055 -0.006** 0.013 
Firm characteristics       
Leverage 0.185 0.141 0.180 0.145 0.005 0.442 
ROA 0.133 0.073 0.136 0.081 -0.003 0.288 
Tobin’s q 1.816 1.063 1.961 1.387 -0.145*** 0.004 
Free cash flow indicator 0.840 0.367 0.879 0.327 -0.039*** 0.008 
Number of observations 987 1,434    
% of observations 40.77% 59.23%    
This table provides summary statistics and industry frequency distributions of publicly listed Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 
2006. Variable definitions are reported presented in Appendix C. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided 
tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2 
Determinants of corporate giving decisions in Fortune 500 firms 
 
Panel A: Determinants of the likelihood of corporate giving 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving = 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection   1.025*** 0.000 0.888*** 0.000 0.215 
CEO ownership (%)   -0.236*** 0.000 -0.169*** 0.004 -0.040 
CEO ownership2   0.008*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.004 0.001 
Tenure (years)   0.006 0.419 0.003 0.665 0.001 
Outside appointment   0.154 0.462 0.131 0.541 0.031 
Governance        
Board size   0.060 0.106 0.001 0.978 0.000 
Fraction of independent directors   0.355 0.467 0.148 0.770 0.035 
Director ownership (%)   -0.030 0.244 -0.019 0.420 -0.004 
CEO-chairman duality   -0.041 0.829 -0.185 0.341 -0.043 
E-index   0.033 0.664 0.124 0.116 0.029 
Profit maximizing variables        
Ad-to-sales 3.224 0.443   2.935 0.490 0.696 
Ad indicator -0.190 0.383   -0.157 0.477 -0.037 
R&D-to-sales 0.760 0.746   0.821 0.734 0.195 
R&D indicator 0.158 0.490   0.052 0.824 0.012 
Assets (log) 0.269** 0.032   0.200 0.130 0.047 
Number of employees (log) 0.284** 0.013   0.283** 0.016 0.067 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.134** 0.038   0.058 0.376 0.014 
Marginal tax rate 0.596 0.505   0.666 0.479 0.158 
Firm characteristics        
Leverage 0.597 0.398 0.569 0.402 0.644 0.379 0.153 
ROA 1.386 0.344 0.476 0.742 1.107 0.444 0.262 
Tobin’s q 0.083 0.298 0.150* 0.083 0.121 0.151 0.029 
Free cash flow indicator 0.126 0.483 0.121 0.508 0.082 0.656 0.020 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.675 0.000 0.581 0.000 0.750 0.000 
Industries        
Financial 0.504 0.210 0.639* 0.074 0.652 0.116 0.144 
Regulated -0.066 0.858 -0.314 0.277 -0.137 0.716 -0.033 
Pharmaceuticals -0.151 0.774 -0.252 0.588 -0.380 0.479 -0.093 
Retail 0.217 0.437 0.238 0.323 0.277 0.317 0.064 
Sin 0.798 0.313 0.666 0.410 0.684 0.421 0.146 
Nonenvironmentally friendly 0.419 0.233 0.135 0.688 0.306 0.403 0.070 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -1,466.435 -1,448.515 -1,406.070 
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.111 0.137 
Observations 2,421 2,413 2,413 
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Panel B: Determinants of corporate giving levels 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes        
CEO charity connection   1.017*** 0.000 0.880*** 0.000 0.015 
CEO ownership (%)   -0.262*** 0.000 -0.196*** 0.000 -0.003 
CEO ownership2   0.009*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.000 
Tenure (years)   0.002 0.793 0.001 0.903 0.000 
Outside appointment   -0.101 0.647 -0.135 0.551 -0.002 
Governance        
Board size   0.048 0.143 0.013 0.714 0.000 
Fraction of independent directors   0.445 0.297 0.128 0.769 0.002 
Director ownership (%)   -0.034 0.181 -0.023 0.300 -0.000 
CEO-chairman duality   0.172 0.347 0.024 0.892 0.000 
E-index   0.071 0.418 0.162* 0.080 0.003 
Profit maximizing variables        
Ad-to-sales 0.410 0.922   0.389 0.921 0.006 
Ad indicator 0.028 0.901   0.062 0.772 0.001 
R&D-to-sales 5.881* 0.053   6.035** 0.045 0.100 
R&D indicator 0.152 0.593   0.036 0.892 0.001 
Assets (log) 0.189* 0.087   0.117 0.298 0.002 
Number of employees (log) 0.089 0.356   0.087 0.362 0.001 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.177** 0.011   0.098* 0.100 0.002 
Marginal tax rate 0.120 0.888   0.075 0.926 0.001 
Firm characteristics        
Leverage 0.838 0.208 0.596 0.300 0.903 0.163 0.015 
ROA 2.201 0.114 0.700 0.619 1.784 0.184 0.030 
Tobin’s q 0.164 0.147 0.289** 0.013 0.205* 0.072 0.003 
Free cash flow indicator 0.168 0.364 0.076 0.685 0.135 0.449 0.002 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.752 0.000 0.911 0.000 0.574 0.000 
Industries        
Financial 1.028** 0.024 0.930*** 0.006 1.125** 0.015 0.019 
Regulated 0.066 0.842 -0.136 0.559 0.022 0.945 0.000 
Pharmaceuticals 1.847* 0.057 2.176** 0.036 1.639* 0.083 0.027 
Retail 0.358 0.265 0.295 0.295 0.418 0.211 0.007 
Sin 0.557 0.258 0.386 0.417 0.521 0.322 0.009 
Nonenvironmentally friendly 0.298 0.289 0.057 0.816 0.200 0.466 0.003 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -3,786.802 -3,757.397 -3,734.225 
Observations 2,421 2,413 2,413 
Left censored observations 987 980 980 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2006. We use logit and tobit regressions in panels A 
and B to explain a firm’s likelihood and amount of giving, respectively. All regressions are estimated with an intercept term. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C.  
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Table 3 
A natural experiment using the impact of the 2003 individual dividend tax cut on corporate giving 
 
Panel A: Changes in corporate giving by ownership quartiles around the 2003 dividend tax cut 
Low ownership 2nd quartile 3rd quartile High ownership 
Before 21.063  6.629  4.346 3.239  
After 23.167  6.582  4.125  1.549  
Before – after 2.104 -0.047 -0.221 -1.688 ** 
Pct. Change 9.990% -0.716% -5.079% -52.159% 
 
Panel B: Effect of the 2003 dividend tax cut on corporate giving 
 Dependent variable:  
Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
Post2003 -0.738* 0.052 -0.011 -0.581 0.781 -0.008 
CEO ownership (%) x Post2003 -0.089** 0.032 -0.001 -0.066** 0.045 -0.001 
CEO ownership (%) -0.153** 0.012 -0.002 -0.168*** 0.000 -0.013 
CEO ownership2 0.006*** 0.004  0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.001 
Other variables from Table 2 yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes  
Industry-year fixed effects  yes 
Log likelihood -3,255.024 -3,211.846 
Observations 2,067 2,067 
Left censored observations 833 833 
 
Panel C: Effect of the 2003 dividend tax cut: Subsample analysis 
 Dependent variable:  
Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 CEO charity connections (1) High dividend firms (2) 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
Post2003 -0.224 0.431 -0.005 0.211 0.707 0.002 
CEO ownership (%) x Post2003 -0.035 0.351 -0.001 -1.223** 0.036 -0.011 
CEO ownership (%) -0.132** 0.039 -0.003 1.230 0.138 0.011 
CEO ownership2 0.005** 0.012 0.000 -0.220 0.124 -0.002 
Other variables from Table 2 yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes 
Log likelihood -2,443.135 -997.007 
Observations 1,475 491 
Left censored observations 466 141 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms from 1996–2002 and 2004–2006. It excludes year 2003 corporate 
giving data as the 2003 Tax Reform Act was officially signed into law at the end of May. Panel A presents average corporate 
giving levels around the year 2003 for CEO ownership quartiles. Pct. change refers to the percentage change in corporate giving, 
that is, (before – after)/before x 100. Panels B and C use tobit regressions, including all the explanatory variables in Table 2, an 
intercept term, and year fixed effects, all of which are suppressed for brevity, except for model 2 in panel B. The tobit regression 
in model 2 of panel B considers industry-year fixed effects, instead of year fixed effects. Post2003 takes the value of one for the 
year 2003 and onward (2003 being the dividend tax cut year) and zero otherwise. Panel C considers firms with CEO charity 
connections (model 1) and firms with higher than sample average dividend distributions (model 2). Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 4 
Subsample analysis based on firm governance and profit motives 
 
Panel A: Subsamples based on managerial entrenchment and board independence 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 E-index ≥ 3 E-index < 3 Board independence = 1 Board independence = 0 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
CEO attributes         
CEO charity connection 1.310** 0.015 0.760*** 0.000 0.726** 0.018 0.953*** 0.000 
CEO ownership (%) 0.030 0.896 -0.175*** 0.000 -0.319*** 0.004 -0.104* 0.053 
CEO ownership2 -0.022 0.275 0.006*** 0.000 0.009* 0.052 0.003 0.167 
Tenure (years) 0.016 0.574 0.000 0.946 0.008 0.594 0.001 0.947 
Outside appointment 0.217 0.666 -0.065 0.758 -0.165 0.609 -0.126 0.522 
Governance         
Board size 0.061 0.551 -0.003 0.934 -0.002 0.977 0.016 0.636 
Fraction of independent directors 1.452 0.213 -0.215 0.631 -0.265 0.816 0.282 0.601 
Director ownership (%) -0.049* 0.084 -0.020 0.403 -0.048* 0.092 -0.001 0.965 
CEO-chairman duality 0.462 0.494 -0.039 0.816 0.186 0.540 -0.034 0.863 
E-index 0.656* 0.100 0.101 0.250 0.325** 0.045 0.055 0.400 
Log likelihood -911.621 -2,719.020 -1,977.542 -1,102.806 
Observations 535 1878 1196 841 
Left censored obs. 213 767 474 330 
Panel B: Subsample of firms with positive advertising and R&D expenses 
 Dependent variable: Corporate giving ratio = log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103 
 Advertisi g and R&D expenses > 0 
 Estimates p-value 
CEO attributes   
CEO charity connection 1.859*** 0.010 
CEO ownership (%) -0.311* 0.096 
CEO ownership2 0.010 0.136 
Tenure (years) -0.044 0.205 
Outside appointment -0.999 0.215 
Governance   
Board size -0.264 0.119 
Fraction of independent directors 1.078 0.528 
Director ownership (%) 0.025 0.797 
CEO-chairman duality 0.020 0.973 
E-index -0.093 0.715 
Profit maximizing variables   
Ad-to-sales -6.324 0.413 
R&D-to-sales 6.284* 0.085 
Assets (log) -0.166 0.690 
Number of employees (log) 0.979** 0.046 
Number of shareholders (log) 0.020 0.915 
Marginal tax rate 0.096 0.976 
Log likelihood -741.540 
Observations 386 
Left censored observations 123 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2006. Tobit regressions include all the explanatory 
variables in Table 2, an intercept term, and year fixed effects, all of which are suppressed for brevity. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 5 
Market value of cash holdings and corporate giving 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 10th 25th Mean Median 75th 90th 
r – RB -0.609 -0.356 -0.121 -0.122 0.075 0.298 
r - RInd -0.336 -0.172 -0.014 -0.027 0.117 0.295 
∆Ct -0.051 -0.010 0.028 0.006 0.038 0.108 
Ct-1 0.008 0.022 0.226 0.061 0.155 0.417 ∆Et  -0.055 -0.009 0.012 0.009 0.030 0.080 ∆NAt -0.143 -0.007 0.156 0.047 0.180 0.567 ∆RDt  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 ∆It -0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.010 ∆Dt 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005 
Lt 0.026 0.072 0.186 0.154 0.274 0.377 
NFt -0.100 -0.043 0.015 -0.007 0.034 0.143 
Panel B: OLS regressions of the market value of cash holdings 
Dependent variable (model): r - R
B
(1) 
r – RInd 
(2) 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Corporate giving ratiot x ∆Ct -0.197** 0.021 -0.199*** 0.007 
Corporate giving ratiot 0.006 0.205 0.005* 0.068 
Ct-1 x ∆Ct -0.153*** 0.001 -0.128*** 0.000 
Lt x ∆Ct -0.018 0.961 -0.125 0.720 ∆Ct 0.797*** 0.000 0.690*** 0.001 ∆Et 0.654*** 0.000 0.522*** 0.000 ∆NAt 0.027 0.170 0.028 0.103 ∆RDt -0.092 0.961 0.799 0.644 ∆It  -1.450** 0.035 -1.126* 0.073 ∆Dt 1.410 0.285 0.472 0.688 
Ct-1 0.068** 0.028 0.038 0.178 
Lt -0.115 0.125 -0.065 0.351 
NFt -0.219*** 0.004 -0.208*** 0.003 
Industry fixed effects yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes 
Adjusted R2 30.66% 8.14% 
Observations 2,671 2,671 
The sample considers corporate giving of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2006. The OLS regression specifications, including 
variable definitions, follow Faulkender and Wang (2006). All independent variables, except for leverage, are scaled by the one-
year lagged market value of equity, Mt-1. The corporate giving ratio is defined as the log (corporate giving / sale) x 103. The 
dependent variables in panel B refer to annual excess stock returns for each fiscal year. Model 1 (2) defines excess stock return 
by deducting the Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolio returns (Fama-French industry portfolio returns) from a firm’s 
raw stock return. Regressions in panel B control for both Fama-French 48 industry and year fixed effects and are estimated with 
an intercept term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 6 
Changes in cash dividends and corporate giving after the 2003 Tax Reform Act 
 
 Dependent variable: Dividends ($) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Post2003 126.162* 0.090 -26.052 0.662 
Total contributions ($) 17.442*** 0.000 11.124*** 0.001 
Total contributions ($) x Post2003 -10.174** 0.022 -6.418** 0.043 
After tax earnings ($)   0.125** 0.045 
Total assets ($)   0.003*** 0.001 
Adjusted R2 24.96% 60.51% 
Observations 449 449 
The sample focuses on Fortune 500 firms that make charitable contributions in year 2002. Sample years include two years around 
the 2003 Tax Reform Act. The dependent variable is dollar dividends. All variables are measured in millions of dollars. OLS 
regressions are estimated with an intercept term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the Fama-French industry. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 7 
Firm contributions to charities affiliated with its CEO 
 
Panel A: CEO affiliations with nonprofit organizations 
 Number Percentage 
Total number of CEOs 105 100.00 
CEOs with affiliated organizations (a) 86 81.90 
CEOs with affiliated donations (b) 65 61.90 
% of charities with CEO-affiliation receiving 
corporate donations, i.e., (b)/(a)  75.58 
Panel B: Magnitude of CEO-affiliated corporate charitable contributions 
 
Obs. 
Dollar 
value Mean SD 
Affiliated donations ($mil) (a) 63 154.44 2.45 4.55 
Average CEO compensation ($mil) (b) 63 982.53 15.60 6.95 
Affiliated donations as a % of average CEO 
compensation, i.e., (a)/(b)  15.72% 15.72%  
Panel C: Regression analysis of CEO-affiliated firm charity contribution levels 
 Dependent variable: Level of affiliated corporate 
giving (‘000) 
 Estimates  p-value 
CEO attributes    
CEO stock ownership -2.702 ** 0.031 
Tenure (years) -21.136  0.347 
Outside appointment -485.513  0.391 
Control variables   
Assets (log) 521.917 * 0.067 
Financial 1,240.391  0.111 
Regulated 1,259.598 * 0.063 
Pharmaceuticals 1,821.895  0.118 
Retail -40.330  0.945 
Sin 277.512  0.693 
Nonenvironmentally friendly 334.091  0.585 
Log likelihood -1,815.437 
Observations 514 
Left censored observations 326 
CEO-affiliated charities refer to nonprofit organizations in which a CEO holds a position of director, trustee, advisor, etc. 
Affiliated donations indicate firm donations directed to CEO-affiliated charities. Data on CEO-affiliated nonprofits are collected 
from annual reports, Businessweek, and Forbes. Data on affiliated donations are extracted from the Foundation Directory Online 
database. The sample considers CEOs of firms from the 2006 Fortune 100 during their tenure between 2004 and 2010. Panel C 
estimates a tobit regression of CEO-affiliated corporate giving on CEO attributes and other control variables. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 8 
Stock price reactions to initial disclosures of charity awards 
 
Panel A: Mean announcement effects of initial charity award disclosures 
Model Event window Observations Mean CAR p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
Market model 
[1, 3] 53 
-0.833% 0.020 0.065 
CAPM -0.820% 0.022 0.071 
Three-factor -0.865% 0.014 0.059 
Four-factor -0.869% 0.014 0.038 
Panel B: OLS regression analysis of initial charity award announcement CARs 
  Estimates p-value 
CEO ownership 0.038 * 0.060 
CEO charity connection -0.023 ** 0.027 
Fraction of independent directors 0.060 0.165 
Adjusted R2 2.23% 
Observations 53 
Panel A presents mean cumulative abnormal returns of fifty-three firms that disclose charity awards for the first time from 1993–
2010. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event-study methodology using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model. The event date zero is the firm’s proxy filing date with the SEC. The last column in panel A reports the p-value for the 
significance of the frequency of negative CARs using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Panel B shows estimates from an OLS 
regression model of firm-level CARs as a function of an intercept, CEO ownership, CEO charity connection, and CEO fraction of 
board independence. Standard errors are robust to heteroscadasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 9 
Determinants of charity donations to corporate foundations and annual giving 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable: Program giving =  log(1 + prog. cont. / sales) x 103 
Foundation giving =  
log(1 + found. cont. / sales) x 103 
 Estimates p-value dy/dx Estimates p-value dy/dx 
CEO attributes       
CEO charity connection 0.216 0.628 0.001 0.788*** 0.000 0.019 
CEO ownership (%) -0.484*** 0.010 -0.003 -0.132*** 0.007 -0.003 
CEO ownership2 0.016*** 0.004 0.000 0.004*** 0.006 0.000 
Tenure (years) 0.045** 0.012 0.000 -0.004 0.684 0.000 
Outside appointment 0.968* 0.057 0.006 -0.239 0.288 -0.006 
Governance       
Board size -0.112 0.183 -0.001 0.032 0.305 0.001 
Fraction of independent directors 2.257* 0.086 0.014 -0.086 0.825 -0.002 
Director ownership (%) 0.065* 0.087 0.000 -0.050* 0.058 -0.001 
CEO-chairman duality 0.944** 0.048 0.006 -0.046 0.762 -0.001 
E-index 0.072 0.669 0.000 0.158* 0.064 0.004 
Profit maximizing variables       
Ad-to-sales 10.969 0.178 0.068 -2.276 0.574 -0.055 
Ad indicator 0.473 0.321 0.003 -0.054 0.780 -0.001 
R&D-to-sales 8.111 0.133 0.050 3.697 0.189 0.090 
R&D indicator -0.513 0.301 -0.003 0.127 0.630 0.003 
Assets (log) 0.583* 0.074 0.004 0.049 0.642 0.001 
Number of employees (log) 0.201 0.367 0.001 0.042 0.618 0.001 
Number of shareholders (log) -0.125 0.311 -0.001 0.114** 0.050 0.002 
Marginal tax rate -0.761 0.728 -0.005 -0.061 0.933 -0.001 
Firm characteristics       
Leverage 0.159 0.912 0.001 0.727 0.237 0.018 
ROA -0.651 0.850 -0.004 1.501 0.236 0.036 
Tobin’s q 0.190 0.333 0.001 0.176* 0.091 0.004 
Free cash flow indicator 0.755 0.101 0.005 0.043 0.805 0.001 
Asset/employee 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.916 0.000 
Industries       
Financial 0.264 0.779 0.002 1.008** 0.024 0.025 
Regulated 0.646 0.413 0.004 -0.071 0.817 -0.002 
Pharmaceuticals 0.543 0.637 0.003 1.082 0.187 0.026 
Retail -0.815 0.148 -0.005 0.514 0.120 0.012 
Sin -1.137 0.234 -0.007 0.665 0.148 0.016 
Nonenvironmentally friendly 0.152 0.833 0.001 0.091 0.728 0.002 
Year fixed effects yes yes 
Log likelihood -1,109.635 -3,197.306 
Observations 2,413 2,413 
Left censored observations 2,151 1,129 
The sample considers corporate giving of 2006 Fortune 500 firms during 1996 to 2006. All tobit regressions include an intercept 
term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 10 
Association of CEO total compensation and corporate giving 
 
Panel A: Fixed effect CEO compensation regression analysis 
Dependent variable (model): Total compensation (1) 
Total compensation 
(2) 
Total compensation 
(3) 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Total giving ratio -0.002  0.800     
Program giving ratio  -0.013 0.234   
Foundation giving ratio   0.007 0.493 
Log(assets) 0.226** 0.039 0.223** 0.032 0.227 *** 0.003 
Stock return 0.088 0.593 0.088 0.590 0.087 0.593 
ROA 0.670 0.700 0.679 0.697 0.674 0.699 
Volatility -1.101 0.345 -1.098 0.345 -1.111 0.341 
Tenure as CEO -0.005 0.353 -0.005 0.353 -0.005 0.348 
Outside appointment 0.185** 0.031 0.184** 0.031 0.185 ** 0.030 
Board size -0.008 0.528 -0.008 0.529 -0.008 0.528 
Fraction of independent directors -0.042 0.657 -0.043 0.649 -0.043 0.654 
Director ownership (%) -0.004 0.554 -0.004 0.556 -0.004 0.551 
E-index 0.058 0.354 0.058 0.353 0.058 0.357 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 47.20% 47.21% 47.21% 
Observations 2,381 2,381 2,381 
Panel B: Distribution of log (CEO total compensation) measuring total compensation is in thousands of dollars 
 10th 25th Mean Media  75% 90% 
Log (tdc1) 7.614 8.250 8.775 8.813 9.930 9.996 
Panel A presents estimates of CEO compensation as a function of the corporate giving ratio, control variables, firm fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects. The OLS regression models are based on 2006 Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2006. We define giving 
ratio as log(1 + corporate giving / sales) x 103. Panel B shows the distribution of CEO compensation – the dependent variable of 
the regression analysis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based 
on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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Table 11 
Association between independent director charity interests and causes supported through corporate giving 
 
Panel A: Director interests and corporate giving causes 
Interests of independent directors Corporate giving causes (first three) 
Purpose % of directors Purpose % of firms 
Agriculture/food 0.00 Agriculture/food 1.05 
Animals/wildlife and environment 11.81 Animals/wildlife and environment 2.53 
Arts and culture 22.15 Arts and culture 18.11 
Civil/human rights 10.34 Civil/human rights 0.63 
Community development and employment 4.64 Community development and employment 4.63 
Crime/law enforcement 1.05 Crime/law enforcement 0.00 
Education 63.71 Education 32.42 
Health centers and health research institutes 25.53 Health centers and health research institutes 3.79 
Housing/shelter 1.69 Housing/shelter 2.11 
Health and human services 3.80 Health and human services 28.00 
International/foreign affairs 14.35 International/foreign affairs 5.05 
Philanthropic organizations 46.62 Philanthropic organizations 23.58 
Recreation 7.38 Recreation 0.63 
Religion 2.95 Religion 0.42 
Research centers and think tanks 18.35 Research centers and think tanks 1.05 
Safety/disasters 1.48 Safety/disasters 1.47 
Science/social science 4.85 Science/social science 1.47 
Youth development 12.24 Youth development 3.37 
Match between the interests of directors and the first three causes supported through corporate giving is 68.80%. 
Panel B: OLS regressions of CEO total compensation and independent director affiliated corporate giving 
       Dependent variable: log (CEO total compensation) 
 Board independence = 1 Board independence = 0 
 Estimates p-value Estimates p-value 
Director supported cause 0.295** 0.035 0.145 0.372 
Controls yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes 
Adjusted R2 26.45% 77.51% 
Observations 486 143 
Information on independent directors’ charity interests for Fortune 500 firms is retrieved from 2005 and 2006 proxy statements. 
The sample in panel A is conditional on positive director charity affiliations. The causes of corporate giving exceeding $1 million 
are based on philanthropic activities from 2005–2006. The source of this information is the Foundation Directory Online 
database. In panel B, we estimate OLS regressions in which the key explanatory variable is an indicator variable for independent 
directors with charity affiliations that are supported by the firm in the fiscal year. The fixed effect (industry) regressions in panel 
B control for all control variables in panel C, Table 10, as well as year fixed effects. The sample in panel B considers firms with 
independent boards (model 1) and nonindependent boards (model 2) separately. Robust standard errors are clustered by Fama-
French industry. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix C. 
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